We consider the optimal choice set of candidates standing for elected office. The decision dimensions are in the number of candidates standing for election, and the experiential base of the candidates standing for election as measured by the length of prior experience held by the candidates and the proportion of candidates with such prior experience. We find that while there are benefits that accrue to having a larger choice, the optimal number of candidates is strictly finite. Second, to justify an increase in the optimal length of prior experience requires strong increases in the ratio of benefits that accrue from additional experience to the cost of abuse of the priviledge. The conditions under which an increase in the length of prior experience can be justified is where the cost associated with abuse of privilege is negligible. This would require the development of appropriate formal (legal and constitutional) and informal (civil society) institutions that ensure that abuse of office remain negligible. Finally, we allow the number of electoral candidates, the length of their prior experience, as well as the proportion of candidates with experience to vary. Strong non-linearities ensure that even very small changes in the parameters that characterize a society can generate strong changes in the optimal experiential base of the political class. Where political systems are slow to change, and do so by means of small incremental changes, severe dissatisfaction with political systems is readily explained in the current model as the result of very small social changes. Moreover, optimal pairings of length of experience and the proportion of candidates with prior experience may not exist. Hence societies may be condemned to suboptimality even should the political system prove to be amenable to change, rendering disaffection endemic to the political system.
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