

### **If neither capitalism nor communism, then what? D.F. Malan's ideological and economic ambivalence, 1895-1954.**

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#### **Introduction**

This paper is essentially about rhetoric, and in particular about the rhetoric of a man and a party which, until 1948, spent more time in Opposition than in power. This facilitated a certain amount of plasticity as well as a measure of disregard for economic realities, in favour of political ideals.

Rhetoric in itself is a fluid phenomenon, meandering its way through the day-to-day debates and priorities. It shapes a society's discourses and values, be they economic, political, social or cultural. Inevitably, it is embodied in policies and laws. This paper will focus on the economic rhetoric of D.F. Malan, the leading Afrikaner nationalist of the first half of the twentieth century, and the man who instituted the policy of apartheid. However, this presents a challenge. In comparison to many of the other questions of his day, Malan was somewhat vague about economic policy. Given his background as a philosopher-theologian, this is hardly surprising. As a politician, he had to abide by the policies of his party, which he could shape, but not dictate. At times, it is difficult to tell whether Malan was voicing his own opinion, or merely toeing the party line. For this reason, the paper integrates Malan's rhetoric with his party's policy – both of which displayed a remarkable elasticity. The implementation of policy, however, is beyond the scope of this paper – but it is certainly the next step if this analysis is to be taken to its logical conclusion.

D.F. Malan was simultaneously a fluid and a consistent thinker. His sophistication lay in his ability to integrate various strands into a coherent worldview, which could move with the times, as the conditions of the day dictated. As a political leader, his strength lay in his rhetoric, and not in his organising ability. There were various instances where Malan brought competent people together, articulated a vision and then left them to carry it out. With a career stretching from 1915 to 1954, Malan was the Afrikaner Nationalists' chief ideologue

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for nearly forty years.<sup>1</sup> His ability to shape and to reflect Afrikaner attitudes regarding the economy was significant.

It is therefore interesting to note that, in the context of the late 19<sup>th</sup> and the 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, Malan maintained a relative ambivalence towards the two mainstream political and economic ideologies. It was the age of ideologies and great social experiments. In the post-WWII era, the NP positioned itself decidedly on the side of the West, in opposition to Communism. Its fear of the Red Peril has led to popular perceptions of the National Party as a capitalist party. Yet, as economic historians have since established, the party that created such a vast machinery to control its black citizens' social lives also did its best to control the economy. The belief in a regulated economy permeated the rhetoric of the first half of the twentieth century. Malan himself facilitated a system where both capitalism and communism could be viewed as hostile forces, and where, at the same time, private ownership and state regulation could co-exist.

This paper will trace both Malan's economic rhetoric and changes in the National Party's (NP) economic policy from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, through to the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. This will serve to counter perceptions of inevitable and linear economic processes by demonstrating that the Afrikaner nationalists displayed a surprisingly ad hoc approach to the questions of the day, and that economic policy was often bent at will. However, some significant constituencies will also emerge, especially with regards to the NP's orientation towards agricultural and labour policies.

### **Embryonic economic opinions, 1895-1913**

D.F. Malan was born in the Western Cape, in 1874, the son of a Swartland farmer. This region was one of the earliest to utilise political tools to advance farming interests, first through the *Boeren Beschermingsvereniging* (BBV) and later through the Afrikaner Bond, under the leadership of 'Onze' Jan Hofmeyr. The party was established in response to excise duties on spirits, an issue that affected the wine farmers of the Western Cape. This meant that it was initially driven by the farmers' immediate concerns, rather than by any particular political ideology.<sup>2</sup> The wine and wheat farmers regarded themselves as the backbone of Western Cape society and, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, became more and

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<sup>1</sup> It should not be forgotten that the Nationalist movement was never homogenous, and had regional and generational variations. Malan was seldom unchallenged, which means that rival Nationalist voices were also a permanent feature of the political landscape.

<sup>2</sup> T.R.H. Davenport and C. Saunders, *South Africa: A Modern History* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 106.

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more politically organised in response to fluctuating economic conditions and their squabbles with merchants. They lobbied the Cape government incessantly to protect their interests through measures such as import tariffs and subsidies – and at the same time, became exceedingly suspicious of the African franchise which, they believed, strengthened the English-speaking merchants' hand against them.<sup>3</sup> It was in this context that an Afrikaner was first defined as 'a person of Dutch extraction, who believed in the advancement of the brandy market, protection to the corn farmer, and the repression of the native.'<sup>4</sup> Malan's father was a member of the Afrikaner Bond, which meant that the young Malan would have imbibed this protectionist, farmer-oriented approach to politics and economic policy from an early age.

It was also an era in which the Cape Colony was undergoing significant transformation. The discovery of diamonds and gold brought with it an influx of capital and the expansion of transport and communications infrastructure, while Kimberley diamond millionaires soon began to feature in the Cape Legislature – the most notable being Cecil John Rhodes, who rose to the position of Prime Minister. Transvaal gold drew the region closely together in a somewhat fractious relationship, which revolved around disputes relating to railways and tariffs.<sup>5</sup>

The Afrikaner community itself, both in the Cape and to the north, began to experience ever deepening social stratification. A class of poor white *bywoners* – tenant farmers whose descent into abject poverty became increasingly rapid – stood in stark contrast to the prosperous class of landed gentry.<sup>6</sup>

It is therefore very interesting, but also somewhat unsurprising, that the very first document in which Malan's mode of thought was articulated, embodied all of these tensions. As a student at the Victoria College in Stellenbosch, Malan belonged to one of the town's two student debating societies. In 1895, at the age of twenty-one, Malan participated in his first debate, entitled 'That this meeting considers that the buying up of farms by a foreign syndicate will prove disastrous to the Cape Colony.'<sup>7</sup> His speech embodied both the Afrikaner Bond sentiments of his social class, and the first stirrings of Afrikaner nationalism.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> For a more detailed discussion, see H. Giliomee, 'Western Cape Farmers and the Beginnings of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1870-1915', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 14, 1 (October 1987), 38-63.

<sup>4</sup> Quoted in *Ibid.*, 58.

<sup>5</sup> R. Horwitz, *The political economy of South Africa*, 61-63, 66.

<sup>6</sup> M. Tamarkin, *Cecil John Rhodes and the Cape Afrikaners*, 29; C. Saunders and N. Southey, *A Dictionary of South African History* (Cape Town: David Phillip, 2001), 35.

<sup>7</sup> DFM, 1/1/108, D.F. Malan, *Eerste Debat*.

<sup>8</sup> For a more detailed discussion of this early nationalism, see H. Giliomee, 'Western Cape Farmers and the Beginnings of Afrikaner Nationalism.'

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According to the young Malan, the company in question, the Consolidated Estates of South Africa, purported to make its fortune through farming and, hopefully, through mining. It had been buying farms in the Stellenbosch, Paarl, Malmesbury and Worcester regions and, in the process, had acquired some very valuable farmland. Malan opposed this venture for a number of reasons, among them the fact that it was *foreign* and that it was a *company* (his emphasis).

Malan argued that this foreign enterprise was harmful, since its first priority was to make profits for its European shareholders and it would therefore export its profits out of the country, to the detriment of the local economy. 'Not Afrikanders, but foreigners are made rich...it is an excellent thing if the resources of a country can be developed, provided it be the country's own capital, provided the advantages connected with such an undertaking are not enjoyed by a foreign country', Malan asserted.

Malan also objected to the involvement of a company in the Western Cape's rural economy, as opposed to individual landowners. Alluding to Europe's industrial revolution, he argued that large companies have, indeed, succeeded in creating development, but on the other hand, they were also catalysts for socialism and anarchism by grinding out millionaires on the one hand, and 'poor ruined wretches' on the other. He only had to point to Kimberley and Johannesburg to prove his point. Malan was also concerned about such a company's ability to bend the political system to its will, which would lead to the neglect of the farming community – there were already rumours about De Beers's ability to influence the outcome of elections.

Referring to Cape farmers' perennial complaints about labour shortages and to Natal's sugar plantations, he raised the possibility of the company importing the cheapest possible labour to satisfy its needs. Such labour would most probably be Indian, which meant that the Western Cape could also be saddled by a 'Coolie [sic] question', of which Natal politicians were trying to rid themselves.

Malan rejected possible counter-arguments that a large private enterprise could stimulate the farming sector as a whole by introducing more progressive agricultural practices. Instead, he maintained that development ought rather to come from enlightened government policies and direct assistance to farmers. This demonstrated an early preference for direct state involvement in the economy, rather than unregulated and uncontrollable private initiative. It was also a reflection of Afrikaner farmers' desire for both state protection and individual freedom in their agricultural affairs.

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The speech was also the first expression of D.F. Malan's ardent Afrikaner nationalism. In addition to his economic arguments, he voiced his concerns about the adverse effects that all these foreign forces could have on the Afrikaners' language and 'national character'.<sup>9</sup>

Malan's student speech was an early expression of the Afrikaners' ambivalence on capitalism and communism, which would become a prominent feature of nationalist rhetoric during the first half of the twentieth century. By the second half of the twentieth century, communism would be one of the Afrikaners' most effective bogeymen. At least in Malan's case, however, this vilification was not rooted in an ignorance or over-simplification of the underlying theory.

Malan arrived in the Netherlands in October 1900, where he undertook his doctoral studies in theology. As a Cape Afrikaner, he did not participate in the South African War, though not out of a lack of desire to do so. He was certain that the war would leave vast destruction and poverty in its wake and, for this reason, undertook to study welfare initiatives in the Netherlands, in preparation for his future work.<sup>10</sup> As a result, he visited the largest orphanage in the Netherlands, the children's village at Neerbosch, as well as a socialist colony where private ownership had been abolished, and its members all worked for a common purse. In turn, each was remunerated according to their needs.<sup>11</sup> This experiment in socialism failed to inspire him. When, in 1903, Dutch railway workers struck for the right to organised trade unions, Malan shared in the middle class' abhorrence of the rising working class. He described the strike in a letter home, but showed no sympathy or understanding for the workers' cause:

The railway employees suddenly got it in their minds to stop working. The hotbed was in Amsterdam. For a few days, not a single train could reach Amsterdam. The government concentrated troops from other areas in Amsterdam in order to be prepared for all eventualities, but the railway employees flatly refused to serve any train containing a soldier. By cutting off all access, the price of articles escalated – it was as if the city was under siege. It could not go on any longer and – the workers got their way. As if they have the power in their hands! Thus, slowly the workers are becoming

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<sup>9</sup> DFM, 1/1/108, D.F. Malan, *Eerste Debat*.

<sup>10</sup> DFM, 1/1/157, D.F. Malan – Cinie Louw, 17 December 1900.

<sup>11</sup> DFM, 1/1/163, D.F. Malan – Nettie Fourie, 28 May 1901.

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the ruling class in all European countries. Over the past few years, the socialists in Germany have increased threefold. If the Kaiser is not careful, he will get it on the head!<sup>12</sup>

Ten years later, as a minister in the Dutch Reformed Church, Malan was invited to give a lecture on socialism. It came in the aftermath of mineworkers' strikes on the Rand. Malan did not regard these strikes as a mere response to local conditions. It was true that the social order in (white) South Africa had been transformed from being generally simple and undifferentiated, into one where class divisions were becoming ever starker. The mining industry had created capitalists who now controlled the world's gold production, but which also faced an ever more formidable and ferocious workforce. It was Capitalism, Malan contended, that gave rise to a diseased society which, in turn, gave rise socialism.<sup>13</sup>

In his lecture, which was later published, Malan displayed a good understanding of Karl Marx's theory, and especially of the principle of surplus value.<sup>14</sup> Yet, while he sympathised with socialists' search for social justice and could identify a number of features which it shared with Christianity, he felt that it was ultimately irreconcilable with religion. Socialists, in their preoccupation with material matters, were hostile to the church's concerns with spiritual problems. Socialists failed to recognise that poverty could have causes other than a perverted social order and, unlike the church, focused on the environment, rather than the individual. Malan was also convinced that socialism was inevitably followed by anarchism, violence and destruction – which he abhorred. Malan's final judgement on socialism was based on his nationalist convictions. Just as socialism did not recognise spiritual needs, but only those of the flesh, so too did it fail to leave any room for diversity. Instead, Malan contended, socialism was 'smitten with the chief malady of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the plague of uniformity, and consequently of mediocrity.'<sup>15</sup>

All of these statements were made in the years before Malan entered politics, and show a remarkable consistency. Malan believed that capitalism gave rise to socialism, and both were hostile to nationalism in that they created and played upon class divisions, which were

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<sup>12</sup> DFM, 1/1/210, D.F. Malan – Nettie Fourie, 1 February 1903 (translated from the original Dutch – my translation)

<sup>13</sup> D.F. Malan, *Socialism: Lecture delivered before the Graaff-Reinet Literary Society* (Graaff-Reinet: Graaff-Reinet Advertiser, 1913).

<sup>14</sup> This is not surprising, since Malan was a student of philosophy and an admirer of the German philosopher Hegel – who also served to inspire Karl Marx.

<sup>15</sup> D.F. Malan, *Socialism*, 27.

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irreconcilable with national unity. Malan was aware that South Africa's social order was changing, which was manifested in an ever-growing class of poor whites, the latter of whom made the Afrikaners vulnerable to the forces of organised money and labour. This can also be seen as a reflection of his own background. As the son of a farmer and a member of the rural clergy, he stood outside these forces and failed to identify with either. Instead, he sought a solution in a third order – that of nationalism.

### **The Party Line, 1914-1934**

The first Union cabinet under Louis Botha fell apart within less than two years. By December 1912, Botha dissolved his cabinet in order to rid himself of the recalcitrant J.B.M. Hertzog. A year later, having failed in his campaign to unseat Botha entirely, Hertzog left the South African Party (SAP) and, in early-1914, established the National Party (NP).<sup>16</sup>

From its inception, the NP positioned itself in opposition to the SAP and the Unionist Party's pro-mining stance, but kept well clear of the Labour Party's leftism, as can be deduced from its Programme of Principles. Its approach to the economy was explicitly nationalist. In a snub to the mining industry, the party undertook to develop agriculture, animal husbandry, industry and commerce as the country's most important sources of income. This had to be done in a manner that would provide the country with economic (and by implication, political) independence and it therefore pledged to support only enterprises that would contribute towards the Union's sovereignty.<sup>17</sup>

It also insisted that the state could not allow its minerals to be exhausted without proper taxation, which had to be employed to establish sources of long-term, sustainable income. This would be achieved through state investment in infrastructure – such as irrigation works.<sup>18</sup>

The NP did not limit itself to the interests of its rural constituency. At a time when poorer Afrikaners were streaming to the cities, the party positioned itself as a party for the working class. It asserted that no other class merited more government attention and insisted that it was the government's duty and calling to ensure that it enjoyed the trust of the working class by looking after its needs, regardless of the workers' political sympathies. It did add,

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<sup>16</sup> For a more detailed discussion, see L. Korf, 'D.F. Malan: A Political Biography', 113-119, 126-127.

<sup>17</sup> Archive for Contemporary Affairs (hereafter referred to as ARCA), University of the Free State, Cape National Party collection, PV 27, file 8/2/1/1/1, "De Nationale Partij: Beginsels, Constitutie, Statuten. Uitgeven namens 't Bestuur daartoe benoemd door Speciaal Kongres gehouden te Bloemfontein, 7-9 Jan., 1914", 10.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

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however, that the rights and interests of employers would also enjoy the protection of the state.<sup>19</sup> This policy remained unchanged until the 1930's, when a new NP, under Malan, would seek to re-evaluate its economic programme.

D.F. Malan entered the political fray the following year, in July 1915. After a few months of initial wrangling, he took his place as head of the Cape National Party. The National Party had a federal structure, to which the four, independent provincial parties belonged. Policy was determined by its Federal Council, with input from the provinces. In keeping with the party structure, Malan's Cape National Party adopted the Programme of Principles drafted the year before, which meant that he and his provincial party were bound to the economic policy outlined above.<sup>20</sup>

At its founding congress, the Cape NP issued a manifesto that was peppered with conflated anti-Jingo and anti-mining rhetoric. It condemned both the government and the Unionist Party for dancing to the mining magnates' tune, and for subscribing to the system of 'Imperial Preference', which made South African trade interests subservient to those of the British Empire. Yet, it also condemned the Labour Party for its disinterest in 'national affairs', its violent tendencies and its disregard for private property. The Cape National Party called for the recognition of trade unions on the mines, the development of factories – and for the protection of private property. It also declared that taxes had to be levied in such a way that productivity would be increased and pressure on the poor would be relieved. Moreover, every person had to be guaranteed opportunities for self-development.

In doing so, it adopted a stance that was coherent with that of the Federal Council, and sought to establish a middle-ground between the irreconcilable forces of capitalism and communism. The NP, as a whole, directed itself towards the more vulnerable sectors of society – the workers – while maintaining a protectionist stance towards its farming constituency, which was still in keeping with the politics of the late-19<sup>th</sup> century. Its overarching concern, however, was Hertzog's well-known motto: 'South Africa first'. It swam against the tide of South Africa's gold-driven, ever-globalising economy in favour of one where national interests reigned supreme.

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>20</sup> ARCA, Cape National Party Collection, PV 27, 8/2/1/2/1, 'De Nationale Partij van de Kaap Provincie. Program van Beginselen.' [1915], 6-7.

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By entering politics, Malan, for his part, could now address one of his greatest concerns from a wider platform: that of the poor white issue. In a series of articles published as editor of *De Burger*, he advocated different categories of solutions that corresponded to the different categories of poor – the most notable being ‘spiritual upliftment’, education (especially vocational education) and new attitudes to work. However, he envisioned a central role for the state in financing and facilitating many of his solutions. He also believed that the state had to make crown lands available for the resettlement of rehabilitated, landless whites – or, where needed, to expropriate land from companies that held it for no other purpose than speculation.<sup>21</sup> This assertion, that fallow land could be expropriated from speculators, would continue to feature in nationalist rhetoric for the next few decades.

Malan looked to the various sectors of the urban economy – mining, industry and commerce – as sources of employment for poor whites and even advocated that the state participate in some of these sectors, such as mining, in order to create the said employment (Malan clearly did not fool himself that private enterprise would willingly hire more expensive white labour).<sup>22</sup>

Malan was well aware that employers preferred cheaper and more docile African labourers to the more troublesome and often unreliable poor whites. Their unreliability could be addressed through the above-mentioned ‘spiritual upliftment’, and their aversion to manual labour and the wage differentiation between white and blacks had to be put aside. Poor whites had to be willing to do the same work as Africans and at the same wages. Thanks to his own racial prejudice, Malan was certain that white workers would out-compete blacks – and he also assumed (rationally, though somewhat naïvely) that, as Africans became more westernised, their wages would rise, which would ultimately eradicate the monetary incentive to appoint them instead of whites. At this stage, Malan recommended only a single discriminatory measure: employers had to employ either white or black workers, but not both. If their workplace was segregated, whites’ sense of racial hierarchy would not be challenged, which would, in turn, make them more efficient workers. However, it is interesting to note that he did not advocate any enforcement of such an arrangement through state controls. At this stage, Malan looked to the state as a participant in the drive to address the poor white question – but not yet as a regulator.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> <sup>21</sup> D.F. Malan, *De Achteruitgang van Ons Volk. De Oorzaken Daarvan en de Redmiddelen* (Cape Town: De Nationale Pers, 1917), 23.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

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When the Rand Revolt of 1922 broke out, the NP had been on the political scene for eight years. It had come close to election victory in 1920, but was thwarted by Smuts's coalition, and later amalgamation, with the Unionist Party.<sup>24</sup> However, as the Rand convulsed, the Nationalists found a new ally, in the form of the Labour Party. Their cooperation during the strikes was soon followed by an election agreement. This, of course, required some semantic footwork, since the Nationalists had been very clear about their anti-communism in the past. While the Labour Party could not be called outright communist, it certainly had very strong leanings towards the left. In order to facilitate its agreement with the Nationalists, the Labour Party watered down the socialist clause in its constitution. The Nationalists, for their part, downplayed their republicanism.<sup>25</sup>

In keeping with his party's decision, Malan also had to adjust his rhetoric accordingly. This was not an insurmountable challenge, as he could shift his emphasis onto his anti-capitalism, which he could argue the Nationalists and the Labourites shared. Yet, his anti-capitalist rhetoric became so vehement that it could easily be mistaken for leftist language. Malan portrayed Smuts's SAP as a puppet of the mining capitalists and their kept press. In contrast, he asserted that the National Party aspired towards greater freedom and was tireless in its battle against 'Imperialism, militarism and capitalist-monopolist domination'.<sup>26</sup> The nationalists would work with the Labourites in so far as the nation's life-or-death battle against capitalist-monopolist hegemony demanded and would ensure greater protection for the country's industries, which were being left to flounder since, under Smuts, 'the protectionist lamb has lain with the free trade wolf'.<sup>27</sup>

He repeated the NP's policy of taxing mining profits, but couched it in far more radical language: 'we shall have to appropriate as much of the country's natural wealth for the country's needs as our patriotism and common sense dictates, and we'll have to fight monopolistic parasites and greedy mining magnates',<sup>28</sup> who were sending this wealth out of the country in the form of 'fabulous dividends', he told his party congress. The mines were, according to Malan, receiving undue state protection, at the expense of their workers, and controlled both domestic politics and the press.<sup>29</sup> Malan's anti-mining speeches could have

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<sup>24</sup> W.K. Hancock, *Smuts II: The Fields of Force, 1919-1950*, 32-4.

<sup>25</sup> C. Marais, 'Toenadering en Samewerking tussen die Nasionale Party en die Arbeidersparty', in O. Geysers and A.H. Marais, *Die Nasionale Party Deel I*, 472-7, 483-6.

<sup>26</sup> ARCA, Cape National Party, P27, file 1/2/2/2/1, "Nasionale-Partykongres, Kaapprovinsie. Notule van Sewende Kongres, gehou op Malmesbury op 31 Oktober en 1, 2 November 1922", 15.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>28</sup> ARCA, Cape National Party, P27, file 1/2/2/2/1, "Nasionale-Partykongres, Kaapprovinsie. Notule van Agste Kongres, gehou op Oudtshoorn op 26, 27 en 28 September 1923", 17.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 18-19.

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been taken straight out of a Boonzaaier-cartoon – but then, this was not surprising, since he was the editor of the newspaper that published D.C. Boonzaaier's Hoggenheimer cartoons, which depicted a fat-cat Jewish Randlord as the true power behind the Botha-Smuts government, and the Afrikaners' greatest foe.<sup>30</sup>

It is important to note that Malan did not confine himself to attacks on the Rand capitalists. As part of his on-going concern about the poor white problem, he also advocated the need for vocational education and for segregation.<sup>31</sup>

Malan's advocacy of segregation marked an important turn. It would seem that, at this point, he thought of segregation as merely territorial segregation – i.e. the system of Reserves, which preceded the Homelands-system. Malan's earlier acceptance of the limited opportunities for unskilled white labour in the mining sector had turned into open hostility – the Rand Revolt had seen to that. He now regarded all white poverty as the result of structural circumstances and therefore looked to structural solutions – segregation being among them. His solution was to develop the Reserves as self-sustainable units, thereby halting African urbanisation and consequent competition in the labour market. This had to be done gradually, and through education and enhanced farming techniques in the Reserves.<sup>32</sup>

Yet, Malan seemed to maintain the nationalists' two-tiered approach to Afrikaner economic interests by treating farmers as a separate category. In their case, he emphasised the importance of individual farmers – as opposed to feudalist landowners and collective farms – as the bulwark of democracy and the antidote to 'Bolshevist' (read: organised) rural labour. The state had to assist farmers by streamlining the distribution process, which would cut out exploitative middlemen, and it had to assist the farmers with cheap capital and lower freight charges on the railways.<sup>33</sup> This displayed an important continuity with the farmer-driven politics of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, since farmers remained one of the nationalists' most crucial constituencies.

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<sup>30</sup> C.F.J. Muller, *Sonop in die Suide*, 350, 363, 367.

<sup>31</sup> ARCA, Cape National Party, P27, file 1/2/2/2/2/1, "Nasionale-Partykongres, Kaapprovinsie. Notule van Agste Kongres, gehou op Oudtshoorn op 26, 27 en 28 September 1923", 17.

<sup>32</sup> See L. Koorts, "The Black Peril would not exist if it were not for a White Peril that is a hundred times greater": D.F. Malan's fluidity on Poor Whiteism and Race in the pre-apartheid era, 1912-1939." (Unpublished paper); D.F. Malan, *Die Groot Vlug. 'n Nabetrugting van die Arm-Blanke-Kongres, 1923, en van die Offisiële Sensusopgawe* (Cape Town: Nasionale Pers Beperk, 1923), 19-21.

<sup>33</sup> D.F. Malan, *Die Groot Vlug*, 13-18.

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When the Nationalist-Labour coalition, known as the Pact, took power in 1924, it did not fail to deliver on its election promises. It passed protectionist measures for its industries, as well as legislation that strengthened white labour. The man in charge of the newly-created Department of Labour was the somewhat eccentric Tommy Boydell, one of the three Labourites to be included in Hertzog's cabinet. The legislative basis of South Africa's white labour aristocracy was therefore accelerated by an English-speaking, left-leaning Labourite, who represented a working-class constituency in the English heartland of Natal.<sup>34</sup>

The Minister of Finance was N.C. (Klasie) Havenga, one of Hertzog's closest friends. He soon acquired a reputation in cabinet for keeping a tight hold on the government's purse strings. Malan, on the other hand, was the only member of cabinet who succeeded in circumventing Havenga to prevent his Health budget from being cut.<sup>35</sup> As head of the departments of Health, Education and the Interior, Malan was in a position to lay the foundations for the South African welfare state and to regulate immigration, which the nationalists traditionally viewed as harmful to white labour. Yet, the majority of his political energies were consumed by the Flag Crisis and it was left to his colleagues to implement the new economic order. It was Hertzog who took it upon himself to institute the segregationist order through a series of bills. However, he soon found himself trapped in a ten-year long parliamentary gridlock.

### **A leader must follow his party, 1934-1943**

By the second half of 1934, Malan found himself at the head of the National Party. The Gold Standard Crisis of December 1932 had driven Hertzog into Smuts's arms, which eventually paved the way for an election agreement and, finally, the amalgamation of their parties. After some considerable soul-searching, and following on the pressure from younger members of his party, Malan led the Cape NP, as well as a few disaffected Republicans in the Free State and the Transvaal, in a breakaway from Hertzog.<sup>36</sup>

The new NP, which was soon dubbed the 'purifieds', now had to set its own agenda. Since it claimed to be the same National Party as before, there was no radical break with its Programme of Principles – apart from the clause dealing with South Africa's constitution, which caused considerable tension between the Republican north and the more

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<sup>34</sup> See T. Boydell, *My Luck was in* (Cape Town: Stewart Publishers, 1947); T. Boydell, *My Luck's still in* (Cape Town: Stewart Publishers, 1948).

<sup>35</sup> T. Boydell, *My Luck was in*, 209-214.

<sup>36</sup> See L. Korf, 'D.F. Malan: A Political Biography', 294-349.

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constitutionally complacent south.<sup>37</sup> By 1937, however, the party had revised its Programme of Principles, which now included an expanded section on economic policy.<sup>38</sup>

Its stance on farming had not changed – it was only better articulated. Agriculture was singled out as the country's chief source of sustainable income, on which the nation's prosperity depended. For this reason, the industry needed state support, and the document proceeded to list a variety of measures that had to be taken in the interests of farmers.

The party also pledged to give active support to viable secondary industries and to provide adequate protection – while keeping the interests of domestic consumers in mind. It also sought to play an active role in expanding both foreign and domestic markets for South African products.

With regards to mining, the NP now undertook to encourage the expansion and development of the country's mineral resources – but not forgetting the state's claim to its fair share in the country's mineral wealth, and with proper consideration for the welfare of the workers. Its clause on labour was also expanded. The party came out in support of 'civilised' labour and promised the protection of 'civilised' labour against both 'uncivilised' and foreign competition. It guaranteed workers a decent wage and living standard and assigned the state the role of mediator in labour disputes. Furthermore, it made the state responsible for the investigation of and solution to the poor white problem.<sup>39</sup>

The 1930's were marked by heightened concerns about poor whites, especially following the publication of its report by the Carnegie Commission. In addition, a broad-based Nationalist movement, driven by a new generation of young Afrikaner intellectuals, sought to make itself felt on every possible terrain, from cultural organisations to trade unions to commerce.<sup>40</sup> It is therefore not surprising that, in the years that followed, the NP's economic policy was constantly being reconsidered and revised.

Malan, for his part, went into the 1938 election with the same anti-mining rhetoric of the early 1920's. Again, he railed against the government for being a puppet of the mining industry, without benefitting from its profits and looked to the farmers as South Africa's true backbone.<sup>41</sup> Just over a year later, however, he and Hertzog had reconciled thanks to their joint opposition to South Africa's participation in the Second World War. Hertzog led a breakaway from Smuts, in the process taking his faithful Minister of Finance, Klasie

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<sup>37</sup> See *Ibid.*, 350-355.

<sup>38</sup> ARCA, Cape National Party collection, PV 27, file 8/2/1/2/2, "Die Nasionale Party van die Kaapprovinsie: Program van Beginsels en Konstitusie (1937)".

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 11-12.

<sup>40</sup> See T.D. Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom*, D. O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*.

<sup>41</sup> DFM, 1/1/1280, D.F. Malan, "Toespraak op Porterville op Maandagaand 4 April, 1938."

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Havenga, with him. What followed was a period of renegotiation and jostling, as the NP had since become the stronghold of a new generation of Afrikaner nationalists, who resented having to make way for the cohort of more senior politicians who followed Hertzog out of the government. It was in this context, in 1940, that the party again revised its Programme of Principles – and hence, also its economic policy.<sup>42</sup>

It added a new clause, which reflected Hertzog's perennial obsession with South Africa's independence. The party insisted on the promotion of South Africa's economic independence, and the freedom to choose its international trading partners as dictated by its own interests.<sup>43</sup> This was obviously in reaction to the system of Imperial Preference, which must have chafed at Hertzog for many years.

The document also promised to create economic conditions that would assure each section of society of a decent living – and to protect the weaker sectors of society against economic exploitation. Interestingly enough, though, the section on labour was slightly watered down. The Programme of Principles no longer undertook to protect workers from foreign competition – and the clause on state involvement in labour disputes was also removed.<sup>44</sup>

In addition to these changes to the Programme of Principles, the party also drafted a Plan of Action, which set out its policy in more detail than ever before. It envisioned an expanded system of state-controlled banks, which would facilitate both agriculture and secondary industry. It wanted to convert the Reserve Bank into a State Bank, and also envisioned a system of *volksbanke* (national bank) which would serve the middle classes.<sup>45</sup>

It continued to place farmer's interests at the forefront of its economic priorities with a range of measures aimed at assisting and stimulating farming. These included the state taking a hand in protecting local markets from foreign competition, encouraging secondary industries that would process agricultural produce, marketing and advertising the said produce and securing markets abroad by nurturing the country's trade relations.<sup>46</sup>

The party also held fast to its principle that the state was entitled to a larger share in the country's mineral wealth. It now became party policy to expropriate land from countries that merely speculated in it, for the resettlement of deserving landless whites. It called for an expansion of welfare services, health services and housing schemes, as well as a minimum

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<sup>42</sup> See L. Korf, 'D.F. Malan: a political biography', 385-399.

<sup>43</sup> ARCA, Cape National Party Collection, PV 27, 8/2/1/2/2, "Die Herenigde Nasional Party of Volksparty van Kaapland. Program van Beginsels, Aksie en Konstitusie (1940), 6.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 7-10.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 15-16.

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wage for unskilled white workers, who would also be protected through a quota system. This added protection would not, however, apply to the agricultural sector.<sup>47</sup> It revealed the extent to which the party still regarded itself as a party for the farmers and the workers – but in the event of the tightrope beginning to swing, it came down on the side of the farmers.

By the end of 1940, Malan and Hertzog's efforts had come to nothing. Hertzog retired from politics, his loyal follower, Klasie Havenga tried to keep his torch burning by establishing the Afrikaner Party and Malan was once again the undisputed leader of the Nationalists.<sup>48</sup> It removed the party's need to compromise on economic matters and it promptly reinstated its clause on the protection of white labour from 'foreign' competition. It also revealed a new penchant for state-driven centralisation, by devising a scheme for the establishment of a Central Economic Council, which would advise the government on economic policy in relation to prices, distribution and retail, which would in turn guarantee the protection of producers, distributors, employees and consumers, and which would protect all classes from exploitation of any sort.<sup>49</sup>

However, there were still complaints from within the party, especially from the Transvaal, that its economic policy was too vague. As a result, a commission of inquiry was set up to formulate a detailed and coherent policy. It was, interestingly, headed by Ben Schoeman,<sup>50</sup> a nationalist from a working class background, who had risen through the trade unions and who represented a working class constituency in Johannesburg.<sup>51</sup> The result was a report, which was presented to Malan early in 1943, but which was never published. Instead, the commissioners believed that it was best to leave the document in their leader's hands, for implementation once the party was in power.<sup>52</sup>

The report consisted of two parts. It first established a moral basis on which the economy had to be built, and then went on to articulate its policy on each sector in more detail. From the outset, it decided that the economy and welfare could not be separated and hence, both received an equal amount of attention.

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 16-19.

<sup>48</sup> See J.H. le Roux, P.W. Coetzer and A.H. Marais, eds, *Generaal J.B.M. Hertzog: Sy Strewen en Stryd*, 730, 731-76.

<sup>49</sup> ARCA, Cape National Party Collection, PV 27, 8/2/1/2/2, "Die Herenigde Nasional Party of Volksparty van Kaapland. Program van Beginsels, Aksie en Konstitusie (1941), 10, 14-15.

<sup>50</sup> DFM 1/1/2055, HNP of V Kommissie i.s. die nodige aksie van die party i.v.m. ekonomiese sake, 1943.

<sup>51</sup> See B. Schoeman, *My Lewe in die Politiek* (Johannesburg: Perskor-Uitgewery, 1978).

<sup>52</sup> DFM 1/1/2055, HNP of V Kommissie i.s. die nodige aksie van die party i.v.m. ekonomiese sake, 1943, 3.

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The committee asserted that ‘the nation has to be regarded as a moral and economic unit, with the right to the dedicated service of each of its members, but also with the full responsibility of providing each with a decent living.’ This statement stopped short of repeating the old socialist maxim ‘from each according to his ability, to each according to his need.’ It also made it clear that ‘in fulfilling its functions the state has to consider as its first duty the consideration of human values and human needs, above mere financial interests.’<sup>53</sup>

In order to achieve this, the state had to ensure the expansion and improvement of the national income through planned development and the reinforcement of its natural resources, agriculture and industries, through a better distribution of wealth, and through alleviating economic instability and ‘parasitic activities’ from its economic life. At the same time, it was in the interest of all classes of society that the white race be maintained in accordance with the principle of trusteeship. ‘Non-white’ labour had to be used in its own interests and in the interests of social development, keeping social boundaries in mind and while ensuring harmonious cooperation with the white race within the boundaries of the state.<sup>54</sup> This is significant on a number of levels. Not only is it the most articulate expression of the NP’s welfare state tendencies (which have run like a golden thread throughout all of its policy documents), but also, of all the Nationalist policy documents up to that point, this document made the most explicit references to the issue of race in relation to the economy. Not only that, but it was also clear that, at this point in time, there was no vision for removing African labour from the so-called white areas.

The report reflected not only the nationalist ambivalence on communism and capitalism, but also its penchant for combining aspects from each in order to arrive at a policy that suited its needs. It made it clear that it acknowledged the right to private property and inheritance, and that it was opposed to communism. It also undertook to encourage private initiative and private enterprise – but it reserved the right to impose limitations where national interests dictated. Exploitative capitalism, such as that which marred the Industrial Revolution, would be eliminated, and the state would step in where needed, be it through placing limitations on profits or through state control over prices. Large capital investments would be made under state supervision and, where national interests demanded it, such enterprises would be controlled and financed by the state – either partially or entirely.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

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This displayed a remarkable penchant for direct state involvement in the economy, which permeated the entire report. As was the case with all previous policy documents, this report also recommended a range of measures to assist and to protect farmers. It maintained that land could be expropriated from large companies in order to resettle landless whites who qualified for such a scheme and it pledged to protect secondary industries from foreign competition – while keeping consumers in mind. The state would regulate industry by using its system of issuing licences, which would ensure that segregation was applied and that Jewish capital would be limited through quotas. Commerce would be left to private initiative, but the state would also be able to regulate that, if it felt so inclined, through trading licenses. The report maintained the party's stance on the mines being an exhaustible resource, which meant that they had to be used for the development of more permanent assets. However, the report hinted at the possibility of the state taking an active part in mining.<sup>56</sup>

The report was the first official party document which explicitly outlined a racial hierarchy in the work force, with whites at the top, Coloureds as an intermediate category, with Africans at the bottom – but who could, eventually, through their own development, at their own pace, occupy the same position as Coloureds. It recommended a minimum wage for each group, in accordance to their needs – which, once again, did not apply to the agricultural sector. It also proposed a quota system, which would prevent whites being driven from commerce and industry by cheaper labour.<sup>57</sup>

The report condemned the system of collective bargaining, which it believed led to large wage gaps and which fostered class conflict and 'contemptible' foreign ideologies. Instead, it proposed that the system of collective bargaining be replaced by 'state responsibility', which would be driven through a centralised 'Labour Council'.<sup>58</sup>

The report resonated with Malan, though it is not certain whether or not he agreed with all of its contents. In a motion to parliament in January 1943, he repeated its assertions that the nation had to be regarded as both a moral and an economic unit, and that human needs were to be the state's first priority. However, he added that the state needed to exert effective control over the mining industry, as well as other key industries – which could include state representation on company boards and state participation in the profits.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> DFM, 1/1/2061, Mosie, 19 January 1943.

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At this stage, his anti-capitalist rhetoric still served him well. Malan continued to portray the Smuts government as the puppet of big money, and insisted that the NP, as an anti-capitalist party, would make the most important contribution to a South Africa that was free of both exploitation and deprivation.<sup>60</sup> Yet, he had begun to shift his ideological emphasis again.

Even before the end of the Second World War, D.F. Malan realised that the world he inhabited would change irrevocably – a war fought on such a scale made it inevitable. To Malan, this new world embodied both old and new dangers. Russia's entry into the war on the Allies' side disturbed him deeply. His anti-capitalism had always been matched by his anti-communism, but Bolshevism carried a sinister connotation that far outweighed the other two evils. Whatever one thought of Nazi Germany, Malan contended, it had served as a barrier between Russia and the West. When Hitler invaded Russia, however, Malan knew that Germany's fall was inevitable and was convinced that the floodgates had been opened:

Bolshevism will not only flood Germany, but the entire Europe, and not least the exhausted, heavily burdened and impoverished England. And then – the Deluge! ...We do not dispute Russia's right to rule itself in the manner that it wishes. But every country has thus far detested Bolshevism like the plague...Bolshevism is a destroyer of the foundations of civilisation and of everything the Christian nations deem to be holy. If this is the case in other countries, we in South Africa have a hundred more reasons to detest and to fear Bolshevism...Bolshevism has long had its eye on South Africa. It wants to initiate a Bolshevik revolution here and therefore seeks its support mostly with the non-white elements. Under the leadership of Communist Jews it has nestled itself into a number of our trade unions. It does not acknowledge the colour bar in any sphere, and where it is legally possible, it agitates tirelessly – with the vehement incitement of the non-whites – to remove it. It does not know any patriotism. It is the sworn enemy of all religion, not least of Christianity. In short, Bolshevism is the negation of everything Afrikanerdom has stood for and fought for, suffered for and died for, for generations.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> DFM, 1/1/2059, "Nuwejaarsboodskap", 1 January 1943.

<sup>61</sup> DFM, 1/1/1814, "Verklaring oor nuwe Oorlogsituasie", 26 June 1941. (Translated from the original Afrikaans, my translation).

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As the war drew to a close, Malan foresaw a new confrontation between Russia on the one side, and the USA and England on the other. He was convinced that the ground was prepared for a new and more devastating war between these two sides.<sup>62</sup> This fear of Bolshevik Russia was tied to the old fears about the preservation of white civilisation in South Africa – Malan never gave serious thought to Africans’ petitions for political or any other rights.<sup>63</sup> Any dissatisfaction in their ranks therefore had to be the result of foreign agitation.

Hence, while Malan and his party formulated an economic policy that was far more left-leaning than ever before, they also began to agitate against a communist bogeyman, without seeing any contradiction between their stance on economics on the one hand, and their approach to political ideology on the other.

### **The temperance of power, 1947-1954**

While most accounts of the 1948 elections centre on the surprise of the Nationalist victory, D.F. Malan, for one, went into it more determined to win than ever before. Not only did he succeed in securing an election agreement with Klasie Havenga and his Afrikaner Party, but there was also a distinct turn in Malan’s rhetoric. He presented the electorate with two main points: the policy of apartheid and, tied to it, the Red Peril. There was no trace of the anti-capitalist, anti-mining rhetoric which he had employed in nearly every election since 1924.

While the substance of the party’s economic policy had not changed, the style had. In his election manifesto, Malan placed the mining industry on the same pedestal as the agricultural and secondary industries. This was the first time since the party’s inception. Malan now argued that South Africa’s prosperity depended on these three sectors and that their interests did not clash, but instead, they supplemented and reinforced one another. The National Party served the interests of all three. He denied allegations from the party’s ‘enemies’ that it was merely a party for the farmers – although, he hastened to add, the party did regard itself as a patron of the farmers. Instead, Malan asserted that if the right balance was maintained between the primary and secondary industries, as well as consumers, their interests would become one. Malan now denied any accusations of the NP being anti-mining, and, on the contrary, reaffirmed the importance of the industry and the need to protect and promote it. However, he maintained in very subtle tones, that mining was exhaustible, and

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<sup>62</sup> DFM, 1/1/2147, “Nuwejaarsboodskap”, [27] December 1944.

<sup>63</sup> DFM, 1/7/2, D.F. Malan, “Waarheen gaan Suid Afrika?” (Unpublished manuscript: Op die Wagtoring, [1946-1947]), 3-6.

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therefore the industry had a large responsibility to assist in the development of more permanent resources. There was nothing hostile about such an assertion, Malan contended. It was merely based on a concern for the entire nation – and for its future.<sup>64</sup>

Malan maintained the party's traditional stance on protecting the interests of the worker, but in a departure from the party's unpublished economic policy, he also called for a healthy trade union sector. However, he insisted that the trade unions had to be free from party-political and communist domination.<sup>65</sup>

Malan was particularly set on stressing the continuity between the NP of 1948 and the NP of 1924. This was the first time that he done so, or at least to such an extent, since his break from Hertzog in 1934. He could do so since, through his election coalition with Klasie Havenga's Afrikaner Party, the National Party of old was technically united again. Malan trumpeted the National Party as the party which, in the 1920's, had established the Department of Labour, had passed wage and pension laws and which had produced tradesmen through vocational education.<sup>66</sup>

Once in power, this continuity carried on. Malan appointed Klasie Havenga as his Minister of Finance, which meant that he reprised the role had played under Hertzog from 1924-1939. By the time he retired in 1954, Havenga had served as South Africa's Minister of Finance for twenty-one years.

Malan himself went so far as to say that there was no difference between the apartheid policy and Hertzog's policy of segregation. It was merely a case of replacing the word 'segregation', which had acquired a very negative connotation, with a new, positive term.<sup>67</sup>

The first apartheid government under Malan was a somewhat haphazard affair. As Deborah Posel has demonstrated, the Sauer Report was far from a blueprint for apartheid. There was very little agreement on what precisely apartheid meant and the NP kept its rhetoric sufficiently vague so as to accommodate all contending views.<sup>68</sup> There soon emerged a rift between what Hermann Giliomee has dubbed the Apartheid theorists (mostly intellectuals who stood for Total Apartheid) and the realists, who recognised white South Africa's

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<sup>64</sup> DFM, 1/1/2390, D.F. Malan, "Verkiesingsmanifes 1948", 20 April 1948.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid; see also L. Koorts, 'An ageing anachronism: D.F. Malan as Prime Minister, 1948-1954', *Kronos: Southern African Histories*, 36, (November 2010).

<sup>67</sup> Whether Malan's followers agreed on this point is an entirely different matter.

<sup>68</sup> See D. Posel, "The Meaning of Apartheid Before 1948: Conflicting Interests and Forces within the Afrikaner Nationalist Alliance", 123-39.

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dependence on cheap black labour and the impossibility of reversing it.<sup>69</sup> Malan's cabinet itself was relatively chaotic, with very little prime ministerial control over the individual departments and very limited interdepartmental coordination. Members of the cabinet were themselves hardly agreed on apartheid, which gave the implementation of the policy a rather ad hoc character. Many of the first apartheid laws had already been party policy in the segregationist 1930's, and there came little from the Sauer Report's emphasis on African development. Malan, for his part, rejected Total Apartheid as impractical,<sup>70</sup> and, in contrast to his views in the 1920's, dismissed the idea of independent homelands as unrealistic – the product of Stellenbosch academics' late-night deliberations.<sup>71</sup>

One of Malan's confidantes, the editor of *De Burger*, Phil Weber, soon found himself rather disconcerted when he witnessed an accelerated process of industrialisation under the Nationalist government, which created a glaring contradiction to its apartheid policy: African urbanisation was on the increase, not the reverse.<sup>72</sup> There seemed to be little clarity about the policy – he and outside observers knew it. After an informal meeting with two diplomats – who cross-examined him about the apartheid policy, and forced him to admit that the government was torpedoing its apartheid policy through its industrial expansion – Weber was rather glum. 'We are, after all, busy with an experiment, and we do not know ourselves what the end is going to be,' he lamented to his former editor, Albert Geyer, who was also a member of Malan's inner circle.<sup>73</sup> Weber was convinced that he had to speak to Malan about his doubts:

...we need to obtain some clarity about what is possible with apartheid. We say that economic integration is fatal, but under this administration, economic integration is assuming even larger proportions. If it continues like this, we will have to face the fact that you cannot make a distinction on the basis of a man's colour forever. You cannot give the natives education, good employment and a high standard of living, and then say that they cannot become citizens of this country due to the colour of their skin. If

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<sup>69</sup> See H. Giliomee, *The Afrikaner: Biography of a People*, 482-486.

<sup>70</sup> See L. Koorts, 'An ageing anachronism.'

<sup>71</sup> ARCA, Sound Archive, PV 193, tape 122, "Interview: Danie Malan, Cape Town", 8 June 1977.

<sup>72</sup> US Library, P.A. Weber collection, 296.K.Ge.111/2, P.A. Weber – A.L. Geyer, 16 November 1952.

<sup>73</sup> US Library, P.A. Weber collection, 296.K.Ge.40, P.A. Weber – A.L. Geyer, 3 February 1951, (Translated from the original Afrikaans, my translation).

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apartheid is our policy, we will have to do more than just trying to halt the stream to the cities.<sup>74</sup>

Geyer agreed. He would not dare to say it in public, but he was concerned that ‘our people regard Apartheid far too much as a question of protecting their interests, without being willing to pay anything for that protection.’<sup>75</sup>

Weber did speak to Malan about his concerns, but it elicited no reaction.<sup>76</sup> Malan remained vague on both apartheid and on its economic implementation. None of his speeches contained any references to the practical application of the apartheid policy. Citing his government’s expenditure on Africans satisfied him that it was applied well, and with benevolence. In a 1952 radio broadcast, Malan informed the American public that the South African government had spent £23 million on services to Africans during the previous year – of which £21 million had been supplied by white tax payers.<sup>77</sup> Eighteen months later, in reply to a letter from an American cleric, Malan wrote that:

Since 1947/48 the Government has increased its expenditure on non-White education from £3,665,600 to an estimated £8,190,000 for the financial year 1953/4. Today nearly 800,000 Bantu children are given their schooling free of charge...It is computed that every European taxpayer “carries” more than four non-Whites in order to provide the latter with the essential services involving education, hospitalization, housing, etc.<sup>78</sup>

Malan continued to cite figures: £3.5 million had been set aside during the previous year to improve farming conditions in the Reserves; another £2 million went into old-age pensions. Extensive loans were granted for housing, while medical treatment was also provided to Africans – mostly free of charge.<sup>79</sup> Africans were therefore also covered by the South African welfare state. He did not, however, investigate the infrastructure that provided these services, nor was there any comparison between the money spent on Africans versus the money spent on Europeans for the same services.

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<sup>74</sup> US Library, P.A. Weber collection, 296.K.Ge.111/2, P.A. Weber – A.L. Geyer, 16 November 1952, (Translated from the original Afrikaans, my translation).

<sup>75</sup> US Library, P.A. Weber collection, 296.K.Ge.112/1, A.L. Geyer – P.A. Weber, 21 November 1952, (Translated from the original Afrikaans, my translation).

<sup>76</sup> US Library, P.A. Weber collection, 296.K.Ge.112/2a, P.A. Weber – A.L. Geyer, 26 November 1952.

<sup>77</sup> DFM, 1/1/2824, “Radio Talk by the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, Dr. The Honourable D.F. Malan”, [n.d.] September 1952.

<sup>78</sup> DFM, 1/1/3000, D.F. Malan – J. Piersma, 12 February 1954.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

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While the first apartheid government maintained its remarkable vagueness on apartheid, the National Party, now in power, again revised its economic policy. The impetus for such a move came in 1951, when the NP and the Afrikaner Party finally amalgamated.<sup>80</sup> Power, and the influence of Havenga and his followers, seems to have tempered it somewhat. Malan's anti-mining rhetoric was, by this time, a thing of the past. It had been replaced by anti-communist rhetoric, but some ambivalence still remained. This was reflected in the party's revised Programme of Principles. The party expressed its wish to bind all sections and classes of society together in a feeling of safety and a spirit of mutual trust, unity and joint national responsibility. It also declared itself diametrically opposed to any politics or policy that promoted class conflict – or which subjugated national interests to those of organised money.<sup>81</sup>

It continued to guarantee the worker a decent living, as well as the protection of white workers from both foreign and black competition, but its detailed, pro-worker tracts were now replaced by the far milder undertaking to promote a feeling of mutual interest and camaraderie between employer and employees. Its earlier statements on the state's role as mediator and regulator were gone.<sup>82</sup>

The party now singled out mining and agriculture as the country's two foremost primary industries, which were the basis for the country's material prosperity and which had to be promoted alongside the parallel development of commerce and industry, in a manner that would facilitate the country's progress and independence. It still hung on to the old clauses that undertook to provide protection for the farmers, but there was no longer any mention of expropriating land from companies. In fact, the clause on poor whites had been removed entirely.<sup>83</sup>

The clause on mining harked back to earlier times; it still purported to encourage the development of minerals, with due consideration being given to the workers and to the state's rightful share in the wealth. Yet, this had been tempered by a more pro-mining stance in the same document, and all references to state taking part in mining, or exerting direct control over the industry had been removed. Secondary industry still received promises of state

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<sup>80</sup> DFM, 1/1/2674, D.F. Malan and N.C. Havenga, "Verklaring", 1 August 1951.

<sup>81</sup> ARCA, Cape National Party Collection, PV 27, 8/2/1/2/2, "Nasionale Party, Kaapland: Program van Beginsels (1952)".

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

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protection, without neglecting the interests of the domestic consumer, along with effective credit and state marketing, both locally and abroad.<sup>84</sup>

In all probability, this reflected a realisation of the state's dependence on income-generating sectors of the economy. Yet, it also embodied both ideological and economic contradictions, as it tried to bend the economy to its political will, notably by trying to maintain a particular racial order in the workplace, without accepting the possibility that it could have adverse effects on the cost and efficiency of production. The nationalists were comfortable with utilising economic principles from both the right and the left, while condemning both, and with shifting their ideological weight about, as circumstances dictated.

Malan retired from politics at the end of 1954, aged eighty. He tried to anoint a successor, Klasie Havenga, but was foiled in his attempt by a younger generation of nationalists, who had been chafing at his leadership for a long time. Malan and Havenga's exit from the stage signalled the end of a generation of politicians who had received their political education in the late-19<sup>th</sup> century and who had dominated the nationalist movement for the first half of the twentieth century. Moreover, the balance of power within the National Party now shifted from the south to the north, as J.G. Strijdom ascended to the premiership.<sup>85</sup> He would only preside over a short interlude. A new direction and a fresh attempt at coherent policy would arrive by the beginning of the next decade, under the leadership of Hendrik Verwoerd.

### Conclusion

The National Party of the pre-apartheid era was essentially a party for white farmers, white workers and poor whites, and it was in their interests that it formulated its economic policy. The party displayed a significant penchant for protectionism and for direct state involvement in the economy. However, this could be traced back to 19<sup>th</sup> century farmer-driven politics, in which the agricultural constituency looked towards the state for protection and for answers to their grievances. The fact that mining was the one industry in which Afrikaners had the least amount of investment facilitated a populist anti-mining rhetoric, which would eventually be tempered as Afrikaners moved up the economic ladder, and into positions of political power, which increased their dependence on the mining industry.

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<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> See L. Koorts, 'An ageing anachronism.'

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Malan and the nationalists could use both anti-capitalist and anti-communist rhetoric to great effect, which served as particularly useful rallying points at election time. Moreover, Malan was able to shift his weight from the one to the other in order to adapt to the circumstances of the day.

Nationalism is in itself not a pure ideology, but one which facilitates a high degree of hybridity and adaptability. Nationalists can cherry-pick from other ideologies in order to arrive at the most advantageous arrangement – and in this sense, the Afrikaner nationalists were no exception. It did, however, also facilitate a certain measure of contradiction within their policies – not least in their economic policy, which reflected their shifting political priorities.