

# Financial Openness and External Adjustment in Emerging and Frontier Market Economies

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# Background

- ◇ Capital flow volatility and drivers of capital flows have extensively motivated economic research (Forbes and Warnock, 2021).
- ◇ This is because large swings in capital flows can cause excessive disruption to the business cycle (Buch et al., 2005; Edwards, 2004, 2007).
- ◇ Policy debates have been inconclusive on how EMFEs should transition to being more financially open. In the discussion, literature is leaning more on capital inflow controls. For instance, Edwards (2004) and Erten et al. (2021) report control on capital outflows as ineffective.

# Background...cont'd


EMFEs are prone to surges, sudden stops and reversals (Edwards, 2004)



Source: author. Red color - reversals & Green color - surge

# Motivation

This background motivate the need for a macro model that can help **EMFEs** counter adverse foreign financial shocks as they transition to more financially open economies.



## Gap

- existing studies neglect the implications of disruptions caused by capital controls under imperfect financial markets with risk-taking players (e.g Gabaix and Maggiori (2015))
- macroeconomic implications and welfare cost of capital control in EM-FEs not adequately addressed (e.g Korinek (2011))

# Contribution

This study contribute to the theory on financial openness, imperfect financial markets, exchange rate determination and external adjustments by:

- ▶ calibrating a model with risk-taking financiers and a bank funding technology that captures financial openness
- ▶ analysing the relative importance of channels of external adjustment in economies and transmission of shocks to the real economy

# Key equations

## Household Utility

$$\max E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ \frac{[(C_t^T)^\vartheta (C_t^N)^{1-\vartheta}]^{1-\sigma_c}}{1-\sigma_c} + \frac{aD_t^{1-\sigma_d}}{1-\sigma_d} - \frac{(\frac{H_t^{\omega_j}}{\omega_j})^{1+\sigma_h}}{1+\sigma_h} \right]$$

s.t

$$p_t^T C_t^T + C_t^N + D_t + R_{t-1}^h B_{t-1}^h = W_t H_t + \Pi_t^{B,F} + R_{t-1}^d D_{t-1} + B_t^h$$

## Domestic production

$$\max_{K_t^j, H_t^j, S_t^j, B_t^j} E_t \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \Lambda_t \Pi_t^j ; \quad j = T, N$$

s.t


$$\Pi_t^j = p_t^j Y_t^j - W_t H_t^j - R_t^k K_t^j - p_t^T (S_t^j - S_{t-1}^j) + P_t^T (B_t^j - R_{t-1}^{L,j} B_{t-1}^j)$$

$$Y_t^j = Z_t^j K_t^{\alpha_j} H_t^{1-\alpha_j}$$

$$S_t^j \geq \varphi^j [W_t^j H_t^j + R_t^k K_t^j] \quad (1)$$

# Key equations: Financiers

## Banking sector set up



$$D_{F,t} = \frac{1}{\Gamma} E \left[ P_t^T - \frac{R_t^f}{R_t^{DF}} P_{t+1}^T \right] \quad (2)$$

# Financiers: Transmission mechanism

- ◇ Capital inflows exert appreciation pressure on the currency of receiving country thus a corresponding fall in exports and output (Clarida and Magyari, 2016; Ahmed and Zlate, 2014; Gourinchas and Rey, 2014)
- ◇ Countries that have recently received capital inflows tend to have risky currencies that depreciate if financiers' risk-bearing capacity is disrupted Gabaix and Maggiori (2015).
- ◇ Change in capital flows disrupt financiers balance sheet hence financiers require more compensation for bearing currency risk
- ◇ The behavior of financiers determine exchange rate movement
- ◇ In the end, financial market frictions are transmitted to the real economy. This adjustment as well impact the external position



# Key equations: Banks

## Deposit branch

$$\max_{D_t, D_t^*} R_t^L L_t - R_t^d D_t - R_t^{df} D_t^f$$

$$L_t = \left[ \alpha_b \frac{\xi_L}{1+\xi_L} (D_t)^{\frac{1}{1+\xi_L}} + (1 - \alpha_b) \frac{\xi_L}{1+\xi_L} (D_t^f)^{\frac{1}{1+\xi_L}} \right]^{(1+\xi_L)} \quad (3)$$

## Loan branch

$$\max_{B_t(i), L_t} R_t^B(i) B_t(i) - R_t^L L_t - \frac{\kappa_j}{2} \left( \frac{N_t}{B_t(i)} - \tau \right)^2 N_t \quad ; \quad j = H, T, N$$

s.t

$$N_t = \sum_i B_t(i) - L_t \quad (4)$$

# Key equations

## Cost of lending

$$R_t^B(i) - R_t^L = -\kappa_j \left( \frac{N_t}{B_t(i)} - \tau \right) \left( \frac{N_t}{B_t(i)} \right)^2 ; \quad j = H, T, N \quad (5)$$

## Shocks

$$z_t = \rho_z z_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^z \quad \dots \quad \text{technology}$$

$$\mu_t = \rho_\mu \mu_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^\mu \quad \dots \quad \text{bank}$$


$$r_t^* = \rho_{r^*} r_{t-1}^* + \varepsilon_t^{r^*} \quad \dots \quad \text{world interest}$$

$$\eta_t = \rho_\eta \eta_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^\eta \quad \dots \quad \text{capital flow}$$


# Parameters

Parameter	Value	Description
$\vartheta$	0.30	Share of tradables
$\sigma_c$	2	Relative risk aversion
$\sigma_d$	5	Inverse interest rate elasticity of deposits
$\sigma_h$	1	Elasticity of labour supply
$\beta$	0.97	Discount factor home
$\delta$	0.03	Rate of depreciation
$\phi^k$	0.5	Physical capital adjustment cost
$\alpha_N$	0.30	Nontradable share of capital
$\alpha_T$	0.50	Tradable share of capital
$\varphi$	5	Working capital parameter
$\bar{r}_{ss}^*$	1.02	Average international interest rate
$\phi^{d^*}$	0.01	Debt elasticity of domestic interest
$\alpha_b$	<b>1(0.5)</b>	<b>Degree of financial openness</b>
$\Gamma$	<b>0(100)</b>	<b>Financiers risk-bearing capacity</b>
$\xi_L$	1	Bank funding elasticity of substitution
$\tau$	0.15	Net worth (capital) to asset ratio
$\delta^b$	0.10	Bank capital depreciation rate
$\kappa$	5	Bank capital asset ratio adjustment costs
$\rho_{z_j}$	0.75	Productivity shock persistence
$\rho_\mu$	0.75	Bank capital shock persistence
$\rho_\eta$	0.75	Capital flow shock persistence
$\rho_{r^*}$	0.75	World interest rate persistence

# Response to positive technology shock



# Response to positive capital flow shock



# Loss analysis

## Optimal simple rule and standard deviations

	<u>Policy 1</u> $\alpha_b = 1$	<u>Policy 2</u> $\alpha_b = 0.5, \Gamma = 1$	<u>Policy 3</u> $\alpha_b = 0.5, \Gamma = 100$
Technology shock			
Loss (Y)	0.0071	0.0035	0.0041
Bank capital shock			
Loss (Y)	0.1136	0.0015	0.0028
Capital flow shock			
Loss (Y)	0	0.0117	0.0141
World interest rate shock			
Loss (Y)	0	0.0043	0.0042
All shocks			
<b>Loss (Y)</b>	<b>0.1207</b>	<b>0.021</b>	<b>0.0252</b>

## Concluding remarks

- When an economy is financially open (no capital controls) and its risk-bearing capacity is low, adjustments in the exchange rate, trade balance, and output increase.
- In contrast, under stricter capital inflow controls exchange rate stabilization is better achieved through improved risk-bearing capacity.
- Welfare analysis based on a quadratic loss function indicates that relaxing capital inflow controls (becoming more financially open) and a more-developed financial system (greater risk-bearing capacity) minimizes output variability.

### **Policy implication**

Policymakers should look to sequence capital flow liberalization to allow for the development of the financial system to bear risk.

So far, I assume there are no nominal rigidities. In my next study

- I will estimate a model with sticky prices, and
- Analyze the role of monetary policy and the impact of large-scale FX interventions by governments. Introducing FX intervention introduces financial imperfection that will alter financiers' balance sheet hence a alteration to their demanded compensation.



End

# Thank You!


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# Appendix I

## Response to negative bank capital shock



# Appendix II

## Response to positive world interest shock

