

# Intervening Against the Fed\*

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## Abstract

This paper studies the effectiveness and mechanism of foreign exchange interventions (FXIs) for mitigating US monetary policy spillovers. For identification, we combine deviations from a daily FXI policy rule with high-frequency US monetary policy shocks, daily exchange rates, firm-level stock prices, and firm-level balance sheet variables across multiple countries. We first present evidence that, without interventions, contractionary US monetary policy shocks spill over through a balance sheet channel: foreign exchange rates depreciate and stock prices fall, driven by those firms with US dollar debt. However, when countries counter-intervene, the spillover of a US monetary policy tightening is muted. FXIs entirely offset the depreciation of the domestic exchange rate and the reduction in stock prices for firms with US dollar debt, suggesting that “intervening against the Fed” protects economies from the adverse spillovers of US monetary policy tightening via the balance sheet channel of exchange rates.

*Keywords:* Foreign Exchange Interventions, Monetary Policy Spillovers, Balance Sheet Channel, Exchange Rates, Dollar Debt

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# 1 Introduction

The Federal Reserve is an important driver of the “Global Financial Cycle” and changes in US monetary policy can have major spillovers to the global economy. When the Fed tightens monetary policy, the US dollar appreciates, and global stock prices as well as credit contract (Rey 2015, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey 2020). Although both academics and policymakers have signaled the first-order importance of this issue, there is limited consensus on how countries could protect themselves against this unexpected tightening of monetary policy.

Foreign exchange interventions (FXIs) are an increasingly popular policy tool among central banks that try to insulate themselves from those spillovers. Figure 1 plots the minute-by-minute US dollar to Japanese yen spot exchange rate on September 22, 2022. At 2 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time on September 21, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announced to increase the Fed funds rate by 0.75 percentage points. The Japanese yen showed a clear depreciation trend until it reached nearly \$1 = JPY 146, the weakest level after the early 1990s. However, when the Bank of Japan intervened in the FX market by selling the US dollar and buying Japanese yen at around 5 p.m. on the same date, the yen suddenly appreciated and became close to \$1 = JPY 140 at around 6 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

Theoretically, FXIs can be effective in offsetting exchange rate movements in response to US monetary policy, when, for example, home and foreign markets are partially segmented (Gabaix and Maggiori 2015, Fanelli and Straub 2021)<sup>2</sup> This example shows how “intervening against the Fed” can actually offset US monetary spillovers to exchange rates. However, despite their widespread use, systematic evidence on how FXIs function as a tool to insulate economies from US monetary policy spillovers is elusive. We aim to fill this gap in the literature.

First, we provide evidence of a US monetary policy-induced balance sheet channel of exchange rate depreciation if countries do not counter-intervene. When US monetary policy unexpectedly tightens, domestic exchange rates depreciate against the US dollar and stock prices fall, and disproportionately so for firms that borrow in US dollars. The depreciation of the domestic exchange rate reduces firms’ net worth and associated cash flows due to higher debt repayment, leading to lower stock prices. Then we show that “intervening against the Fed”, by unexpectedly selling the US dollar in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock, mitigates exchange rate depreciation and stock price declines for

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<sup>1</sup>The timing of intervention is not publicly disclosed by the Bank of Japan. The Japanese yen was bought and started appreciating at around 5:03 p.m. JST. At 5:15 p.m., The Ministry of Finance announced that the intervention was carried out and held a press conference at 6:30 p.m. The volume of the intervention in September 2022 was around 2.8 trillion yen or approximately 20 billion US dollars, which was a record high. The last time Japan intervened in the FX market by selling the US dollar was in 1998, making the intervention unexpected for markets (Duguid 2022).

<sup>2</sup>FXIs are not necessarily conducted under the authority of central banks. For example, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) provides the Ministry of Finance (MOF) with background information on FX markets. Based on this information, the MOF gives the BOJ instructions for FXIs and the BOJ conducts FXIs on behalf of MOF. In this paper, we use the term “central banks” to indicate the monetary authorities that conduct FXIs in general. Another example is Brazil, where 110 billion US dollars were sold in two years following Fed’s taper announcement in May 2013 (Chamon et al. 2017, Fanelli and Straub 2021).

firms, but only for those with US dollar debt. When US monetary policy tightens and central banks counter-intervene, exchange rates, and stock prices for firms with and without US dollar debt remain statistically and economically unchanged. These results suggest that intervening against the Fed mutes the balance sheet channel of exchange rates triggered by US monetary policy and can protect countries from exposure to the Global Financial Cycle.

There are several challenges in identifying the channels through which US monetary policy spills over to other countries and whether FXIs are successful in mitigating them. Both US monetary policy and FXIs are endogenously conducted, taking current and future information into account. Moreover, changes in monetary or FX policy are inextricably linked and hard to isolate from other factors to identify the direct effect of monetary policy and FXIs. We overcome these issues in several ways.

We employ a multi-event study high-frequency approach by exploiting daily data on FXIs, firm-level stock returns, and exchange rates around US monetary policy decisions.<sup>3</sup> In particular, we use an event-study local projection difference-in-differences (LP-DID) approach in the spirit of [Dube et al. \(2023\)](#) around each FOMC meeting.

To measure the direct effect of interventions, free of confounding factors, we use daily FXI data from 13 countries to identify unexpected counter-interventions in the FX market. These unexpected counter-interventions can arguably be interpreted as direct effects of FXIs. We start by defining expected and unexpected counter-interventions as situations in which the central bank sells (buys) US dollars when the Fed unexpectedly tightens (loosens) policy.<sup>4</sup> Then, we estimate an FX counter-intervention policy rule to understand central banks' decisions to intervene against the Fed depending on observable and unobservable macroeconomic and financial characteristics, as well as historical responses to Federal Reserve policy. The intervention implied by this rule can be interpreted as an expected intervention. Estimating an FXI rule allows us to decompose the variance of interventions into explained and unexplained parts. Deviations from the FXI policy rule can be interpreted as unexpected FXIs, similar to residuals from a monetary policy Taylor rule. Finally, we define "intervening against the Fed" if the central bank surprisingly counter-intervenes within five days after the FOMC meeting.

For US monetary policy, as standard in the literature, we use cleanly identified high-frequency shocks by [Nakamura and Steinsson \(2018\)](#). The high-frequency monetary shocks are estimated by a change in Fed funds futures in sufficiently narrow time windows around the FOMC announcement so that monetary shocks are orthogonal to the limited amount of information revealed in this narrow window. Using this monetary surprise can be seen as an external driver of changes in the exchange rate and allows us to

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<sup>3</sup>We refer to daily as high-frequency. For the market microstructure literature, this definition may be inappropriate, but as the international finance literature predominantly focuses on monthly or quarterly changes, we consider our approach high-frequency within that tradition.

<sup>4</sup>Selling US dollars in exchange for domestic currency is intended to put appreciation pressure on the exchange rate by absorbing its supply and vice versa.

compare the responses of exchange rates and stock prices to FOMC announcements in countries that do and do not counter-intervene against the US dollar shortly after the announcement.

There are many channels through which US monetary policy can spill over to other countries. A tighter US monetary policy may lower demand and imports in the US, with adverse effects on foreign economies. Higher US monetary policy rates, *ceteris paribus*, also predict an appreciation of the US dollar on impact due to interest rate differentials in the uncovered interest parity (UIP) equation. According to an expenditure switching channel, the depreciation of domestic exchange rates relative to the US dollar would then increase exports and raise the stock prices of firms. However, the depreciation of currency relative to the US dollar also reduces net worth for firms that borrow in US dollars, increasing their debt payments and lowering their cash flows, resulting in lower stock prices (Krugman 1999, Céspedes et al. 2004).

The balance sheet channel of exchange rates through US monetary policy predicts that stock prices of firms with US dollar debt decline by more than those that borrow in domestic currency. Our high-frequency approach, coupled with firm-level stock prices and information on the currency decomposition of corporate debt, allows us to compare the cross-sectional heterogeneity in firms' stock price responses within each country, at a given point in time, to a contractionary monetary policy shock, ruling out that other macroeconomic factors are driving the response. We find that, when countries do not counter-intervene against the Fed, stock prices of firms with US dollar debt decline immediately after US monetary policy unexpectedly tightens. Quantitatively, a 10 basis point surprise increase in the federal funds rate is associated with a 0.3% decline in stock prices for firms with US dollar debt on the day of the FOMC meeting, building up to almost 1% after three days. In contrast, firms without US dollar debt see a decline in the stock price of less than 0.1% on impact, and the effect does not build up. These results strongly suggest that US monetary policy affects stock prices abroad through a balance sheet channel.

We further corroborate whether the role of changes in debt repayments is due to the depreciation of the currency and not due to other factors that are correlated with having US dollar debt. We refine our identification strategy by exploiting the debt maturity structure of firms around the FOMC announcements.<sup>5</sup> If firms happen to have dollar debt that matures around unexpected Fed hikes, the depreciation of local currency increases the cost of rolling over debt in terms of local currency. On the other hand, if the debt does not mature around the monetary shocks, the increase in debt rollover costs is small. We show that when the domestic central banks intervene against the Fed policy by buying local currency in response to a tightening shock, this disproportionately benefits the firms that have US dollar debt that matures around the FOMC announcement relative to a scenario in which the dollar debt does

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<sup>5</sup>The debt maturity identification approach follows the approach by Almeida et al. (2011) and Duval et al. (2020) that studies the effect of debt maturity during the global financial crisis on firms' outcomes. More recently, this approach has been applied in the context of the US dollar debt maturity structure around exchange rate movements by Casas et al. (2022).

not mature around the FOMC announcement. Since the debt maturity structure is orthogonal to exchange rate movements, the effect of debt repayment on stock prices can potentially be interpreted causally.

To shed more light on this channel, we move toward the effect of US monetary policy on exchange rates. If the balance sheet channel of US monetary policy is at work, one would expect the behavior of exchange rates to mirror that of the stock price for firms with US dollar debt. And, indeed, for countries that do not counter-intervene, exchange rates depreciate strongly after the US monetary policy shock. Quantitatively, a 10 basis point increase in the US monetary policy rate leads to a persistent 2-3% depreciation of foreign currency.

The depreciation of the exchange rate may also trigger an expenditure switching channel, increasing demand from foreigners due to lower prices, in which case exporting firms would benefit disproportionately (Mundell 1957, Fleming 1962). However, the contractionary US monetary policy shock reduces demand from the US via intertemporal substitution and therefore also demand for exports, potentially offsetting the positive effect from the exchange rate (Gourinchas 2018).<sup>6</sup> In fact, when countries do not intervene and the exchange rate depreciates, the stock prices of exporters remain stable while those of non-exporters fall, suggesting that the negative demand effects from the contractionary monetary policy shock and the positive effects from the expenditure switching channel offset each other.

Turning to the role of FXIs in US monetary policy spillover, we estimate the effect of intervening against the Fed on the exchange rate and stock prices across the firm distribution in response to monetary policy shocks. By tracking the effect of the FXI within a short window after the FOMC meeting, we likely capture the central banks' decision to "intervene against the Fed" to mitigate exchange rate fluctuations. If, instead, we studied the unconditional effects of FXIs on exchange rates, would be more difficult to disentangle the cause of the intervention. For instance, it may be possible that the central bank intervenes because it receives a signal about the economy that is unobservable, making it more difficult to understand the counterfactual response of the exchange rate if the central bank had not intervened. As we employ an event study in a short window around the FOMC announcement, the exchange rate change is likely driven by US monetary policy and, without the FOMC decision, would have remained stable, as the pre-trends indicate, allowing us to estimate a more precise counterfactual of not intervening. The marginal effect of counter-intervening in response to a contractionary US monetary policy shock appreciates the exchange rates and raises stock prices for firms with US dollar debt but does not affect the stock price of firms without US dollar debt, mitigating US monetary policy spillovers.

To evaluate the extent to which the counter-intervention offsets the depreciation of the currency and the stock price decline for firms with US dollar debt, we only focus on situations in which the Fed surprisingly hikes rates and the country unexpectedly sells US dollars to counteract the surprise (and

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<sup>6</sup>Under dominant currency pricing, export quantities are not expected to increase in the short-run, but revenues in domestic currencies are, also with positive implications for the stock price of exporters.

vice versa). Using these unexpected monetary shocks and FXIs, we present evidence that intervening against the Fed fully prevents exchange rate disturbances against the US dollar when US monetary policy changes suddenly. When the Fed hikes rates unexpectedly and the country sells the US dollar and buys domestic currency to counteract the surprise, the domestic currency does not depreciate against the US dollar, and stock prices for both firms with and without US dollar debt remain unchanged. These results suggest that the channel through which FXIs offset the spillover of US monetary policy is by preventing a depreciation of the exchange rate and consequently higher debt repayments for firms with US dollar debt.

To credibly counter-intervene against the Fed to stabilize their exchange rate, countries need to have accumulated a sufficient level of reserves. In fact, since the Asian financial crisis in the 1990s, emerging market economies have built up reserves to hedge against rollover risk (Bianchi et al. 2018). When reserve levels are low, central banks' attempts to stabilize the exchange rate and consequently the economy may be unsuccessful as they lack the credibility to do so in the future (Fanelli and Straub 2021). Empirically, we find evidence that countries that have a large share of FX reserves are more effectively counter-intervening against the Fed relative to their counterparts. This result suggests that the buildup of reserves over the last decades could have dampened the role of US monetary policy spillovers if countries had counter-intervened.

While an FXI may prevent a depreciation in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock, it does not mitigate the negative demand effects on imports originating from the US. The benefits of the contractionary monetary policy shock through the expenditure switching channel for exporters may therefore vanish. The costs, however, through reduced demand, remain the same. Consequently, FXIs may harm exporters through a less depreciated exchange rate. Indeed, we find suggestive evidence that when countries do intervene, the stock prices of exporters fall in the same manner as those of non-exporters, and hence, the effects of intervening against the Fed are negative for exporting firms.

One potential concern with our analysis could be that there are other confounding factors that affect both our dependent variable (stock returns and the exchange rate) and our independent variable (FXI) concurrently and introduce an omitted variable bias to our estimates. We mitigate this concern already in our baseline specification, in which we estimate unexpected deviations from an FXI rule. However, it is still possible that not all characteristics are controlled for, and our deviation from the FXI rule does not fully reflect an exogenous FXI. For instance, unwarranted market disturbances or negative news about the economy that are not captured in the FXI rule may affect stock prices and the exchange rate in response to US monetary policy, while at the same time inducing the central bank to intervene in the FX market.

While we acknowledge this limitation, it is unlikely that this omitted variable explains our results. The exchange rate tends to depreciate systematically in "bad times" against the US dollar (Hassan et al.

2023). When the negative shock hits the economy and stock prices fall, one would expect the central bank to sell the US dollar to prevent the depreciation of the exchange rate. However, we find that selling the US dollar against the domestic currency is rather associated with an appreciation of the domestic currency and an increase in stock prices relative to the no-intervention case. This renders it unlikely that unobservable confounders are driving the relationship between FXIs and those outcome variables.

Moreover, the unobserved shock would likely affect not only the stock prices of firms with US dollar debt but also the stock prices of other firms. In sum, if there were various unobservable confounders, such as a negative shock when the central bank counter-intervened, the true effect of FXIs would likely even be stronger than we find. Hence, our coefficients may, if anything, provide a “lower bound” estimate, and we would underestimate the true effect of FXIs.

**Literature.** Our paper contributes to the FXIs literature and to how US monetary policy spills over to other countries. Our event study approach exploits daily firm-level stock prices across several countries, as well as exchange rates combined with FXIs data and US monetary surprises purely identified by a high-frequency approach, see, e.g., [Nakamura and Steinsson \(2018\)](#).

Many central banks have accumulated FX reserves reaching record highs to keep their currencies depreciated.<sup>7</sup> However, often the benefits of a depreciated currency for boosting exports remain elusive ([Gopinath et al. 2020](#)). Instead, an increase in US dollar debt of companies in emerging markets has raised concerns that depreciations are contractionary rather than expansionary ([Céspedes et al. 2004](#), [Krugman 1999](#)). This raises the question of whether the accumulated US dollar reserves can potentially be used to help insulate an economy against an undesired tightening of US monetary policy and how FXIs can stabilize the exchange rate and the economy more broadly.

A large empirical literature studies the effect of FXIs on exchange rates ([Dominguez and Frankel 1993](#), [Dominguez 2003](#), [Dominguez et al. 2013](#), [Adler et al. 2019](#), [Fratzcher et al. 2019; 2020](#), [Hofmann et al. 2019](#), [Blanchard et al. 2015](#), [Kuersteiner et al. 2018](#), [Fatum and Hutchison 2010](#)).<sup>8</sup> However, none of these papers study the effect of FXIs on stock prices across the firm distribution, nor do they study the interaction between FXIs and US monetary policy.<sup>9</sup>

We also contribute to the literature on US monetary policy spillovers and the global financial

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<sup>7</sup>For example, the Swiss National Bank has sold the franc to counter the overvaluation due to its safe-haven status and boost the export industries ([Jordan 2017](#)). Chinese foreign reserves increased from 733 billion US dollars in July 2005 to 3.99 trillion US dollars in June 2014 ([Das 2019](#)).

<sup>8</sup>Recent theoretical advances show that interventions can affect the exchange rate and enhance welfare. [Gabaix and Maggiori \(2015\)](#), [Cavallino \(2019\)](#), [Amador et al. \(2020\)](#), [Fanelli and Straub \(2021\)](#), [Maggiori \(2022\)](#), and [Itskhoki and Mukhin \(2023\)](#) study FXIs under partial segmentation of home and foreign currency bond markets. Since international financial intermediaries have limited risk-bearing capacity, FXIs affect the exchange rate by changing their balance sheet composition. [Hassan et al. \(2023\)](#) show that policies that appreciate domestic currency when the marginal utility of world investors is high increase the market value of firms and stabilize the country’s wealth. Hence, small countries optimally choose to stabilize their currencies relative to the US dollar.

<sup>9</sup>[Roussanov and Wang \(2023\)](#) show that global FX dealers buy US dollars in response to contractionary monetary policy shocks, potentially representing the counterpart of the foreign central banks that sell the US dollar in response to contractionary monetary policy shocks.

cycle (Rey 2015, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey 2020, Kalemli-Özcan 2019).<sup>10</sup> There is a vast empirical evidence of the spillover of US monetary policy to country-level equity markets (Zhang 2022, Wiriadinata 2021, Boehm and Kroner 2023), exchange rates (Gürkaynak et al. 2021, Roussanov and Wang 2023, Eichenbaum and Evans 1995, Faust et al. 2007, Anderson et al. 2003), and interest rates (Timmer 2018, Zhang 2022).<sup>11</sup> To identify the channels through which US monetary policy spills over, Wiriadinata (2021) uses foreign currency debt data, while Zhang (2022) uses currency invoicing shares. Dedola et al. (2017) show there is no clear-cut systematic relation emerges between country responses and likely relevant country characteristics, such as their income level, dollar exchange rate flexibility, financial openness, trade openness versus the US dollar exposure in foreign assets and liabilities, and incidence of commodity exports.

Using cross-country heterogeneity, however, is plagued by several issues in identifying the channels of monetary policy. For instance, it is impossible to rule out that other unobserved country-specific factors are driving the results that are correlated with the country's characteristics. Moreover, country-level data masks a large part of the heterogeneity within countries.<sup>12</sup>

We study the spillovers of US monetary policy on stock prices using a cross-section of firms' stock returns. Using daily stock-price data combined with high-frequency US monetary policy shocks allows us to understand the channel through which US monetary policy spills over to other countries. Surprisingly, at least to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the cross-section of stock price reactions to US monetary policy in an international context.<sup>13</sup> The advantage of using firm-level heterogeneity in stock price responses is that it allows us to identify the channels of US monetary policy more cleanly at a high frequency and only exploit differences across firms, controlling for time-variant country-specific observed and unobserved heterogeneity.<sup>14</sup> Our results highlight the importance of taking FXIs into account when analyzing monetary policy spillovers. When we combine non-intervention and intervention events, it is difficult to find evidence in favor of US monetary policy spillovers, as the interventions mask important heterogeneity in the effects of US monetary policy abroad.

The majority of literature on international US monetary spillover combines high-frequency US monetary shocks with lower-frequency data. Following Gertler and Gilchrist (2015) and Gorodnichenko

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<sup>10</sup>Akinci and Queralto (2019), Aoki et al. (2020), Gopinath and Stein (2021) study US monetary policy theoretically and consider corporate or bank balance sheet risk when firms issue debt denominated in dollars.

<sup>11</sup>Di Giovanni and Hale (2022) study stock market spillovers of US monetary policy through the global production network. In contrast to exploiting firm-level heterogeneity, they aggregate stocks to the country-sector level and do not study foreign currency debt, or FXIs.

<sup>12</sup>An exception is Morais et al. (2019), who match loan-level bank lending data with firm-level balance sheet data and study the international risk-taking channel of US monetary policy. While they use monthly loan data, we use daily data on FXIs and firm-level stock prices, as discussed below.

<sup>13</sup>A vast literature studies US firm-level equity returns in response to US monetary policy, but abstracts away from foreign firms (Gorodnichenko and Weber 2016, Ai et al. 2022, Ozdagli and Velikov 2020, Chava and Hsu 2020, Gürkaynak et al. 2022).

<sup>14</sup>The caveat of using stock price data is that we are only able to study public firms, and we cannot see whether a reduction in stock prices eventually materializes in changes in real outcomes, such as employment, domestic revenue, and profitability of those firms, see, e.g., Rodnyansky (2019).



and Weber (2016), Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2020) aggregate high-frequency US monetary shocks in each month and Dedola et al. (2017) in each quarter, and study their implication on the exchange rate, capital flows, and/or real outcomes. In contrast, we combine daily data on exchange rates, firm stock prices, and FXIs with US monetary surprises. There are several advantages to using daily data as dependent variables. FOMC meetings occur at irregular intervals within each year, and aggregating monetary surprises over each month or quarter can induce serial correlation in aggregate shocks and inconsistent estimates of aggregate impulse responses (Ramey 2016, Anderson and Cesa-Bianchi 2023). Moreover, the magnitude of high-frequency shock is small (see section 2). This complicates estimating the effect of variables in the distant future; for example, output several quarters away is influenced by many other confounding factors. In order to minimize this “power problem,” we study the response of daily exchange rates and stock prices, which move contemporaneously with monetary shocks (Nakamura and Steinsson 2018).

We also relate to the literature that studies how central banks respond when US monetary policy tightens. In theory, the central bank should let the exchange rate depreciate (Gali and Monacelli 2005, Friedman 1953), but in practice there is a fear of floating (Calvo and Reinhart 2002), the reluctance of many central banks to let the exchange rate fluctuate. In fact, our results show that the monetary policy-induced depreciation does not benefit exporters as the positive expenditure switching effect is offset by negative demand effects, while at the same time harming firms that have US dollar borrowing. The IMF integrated policy framework (Basu et al. 2020) studies the interaction between monetary policy and FXIs from a theoretical perspective. They show that after an adverse shock to the foreign appetite for domestic currency debt, FXIs reduce the need for the policy rate to be increased and, in that sense, can enhance monetary autonomy. Empirically, we show that by intervening against the Fed, central banks can offset the depreciation, helping firms with US dollar debt but harming exporters by muting the expansionary expenditure switching effect.<sup>15</sup>

## 2 Data

### 2.1 Sources

We combine data from several sources. Our sample period is between 2000 and 2019, during which the data on US monetary shocks and corporate balance sheets are available.

First, we collect data on sterilized FXIs based on Fratzscher et al. (2019) and Adler et al. (2021). We use publicly available databases on central bank websites and the FRED database.<sup>16</sup> Some countries

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<sup>15</sup>Kalemli-Özcan (2019) shows that monetary policy divergence vis-à-vis the United States has larger spillover effects in emerging markets than in advanced economies. Domestic monetary policy is ineffective in mitigating this effect, as the pass-through of policy rate changes into short-term interest rates is imperfect.

<sup>16</sup>Due to the data limitations, we focus on central banks’ direct purchases and sales of the US dollar. In reality, central banks’

do not publicly disclose the data due to secret interventions, in which case we individually contacted the central banks to be granted access to the data. We then restricted the sample countries based on the following criteria: first, to use as much high-frequency data as possible, we only use daily intervention data and exclude countries and time periods where only monthly or quarterly data is available. Second, since we study interventions against US monetary shocks, our sample only comprises countries that intervened against the US dollar multiple times during the sample period.<sup>17</sup> The following 13 countries have available data and satisfy the above criteria: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Georgia, Hong Kong, Japan, Mexico, Peru, Switzerland, and Turkey. One limitation is that the intraday data on FXIs is difficult to obtain. However, even if we use daily data, our result shows that FXIs have persistent effects on the exchange rate and stock market.<sup>18</sup>

To address the endogeneity concern of monetary policy, we use the high-frequency change in the Fed funds rate (FFR) identified by [Nakamura and Steinsson \(2018\)](#), which was subsequently updated by [Acosta \(2023\)](#). They estimate the changes in Fed funds futures in a 30-minute window around the FOMC announcement. We obtain daily data on the spot exchange rate and stock price from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Since Datastream reports the closing exchange rate at 4 p.m. London time, and FOMC announcement is made around 2 p.m. Washington time (7 p.m. London time), we moved the reported dates of exchange rates by one date forward so that the exchange rate on each date is reported after the FOMC announcement on the same date. Since the end-of-date stock price is released at different times in different time zones, we adjusted the reported dates for the stock price depending on whether the stock price is released before or after the FOMC announcement.

We use corporate balance sheet data on the Capital IQ platform provided by S&P Global Market Intelligence. The advantage of Capital IQ is that it provides information on the currency denomination of debt, which is not available in other databases such as Worldscope, Compustat, and Orbis. Its Capital Structure database provides detailed information on each debt instrument held by each firm, including the principal amount due, repayment currency, and maturity. For example, Agrometal S.A.I., a manufacturing firm in Argentina, had a total outstanding debt of 5.6 million dollars on December 31, 2015. Among them, 2.2 million dollars are repaid in US dollars, and the remaining 3.4 million dollars are repaid in Argentine pesos.<sup>19</sup> Hence, the share of dollar bonds over total bonds is 39 percent. Capital IQ provides annual data on corporate balance sheets since 2001. The sample is restricted to publicly listed firms, as the data on stock prices is available.

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communication with the market can also affect the exchange rate via a signalling channel.

<sup>17</sup>We focus on US monetary shocks since a limited number of countries disclose daily FXI data against the euro and Japanese yen.

<sup>18</sup>[Kuersteiner et al. \(2018\)](#) study intraday intervention data in Colombia between 2001 and 2012. However, intraday data is not available for the other 12 countries in our sample. See also [Dominguez \(2003\)](#) and [Dominguez et al. \(2013\)](#) for analysis using intraday intervention data.

<sup>19</sup>Capital IQ converts the principal due of peso bonds to US dollars using the end-of-year spot exchange rate.

We complement the data using a variety of sources. Firm-level data on exports and the incorporation date is available on Worldscope. To measure firms' reliance on intermediate imports in their production, we use sector-level data on import content of exports in OECD input-output tables, following [Rodnyansky \(2019\)](#).<sup>20</sup> The SIC industry code in Capital IQ is matched with the ISIC Revision 4 industry code using a conversion table in the United Nations Statistics Division. Appendix A provides details on the data cleaning procedure and selection criteria for our sample of firms.

Finally, for country-level characteristics, we collect the data on monthly policy rates from the IMF Monetary and Financial Statistics. The data on GDP, inflation rate, trade balance, and unemployment rate are retrieved from the World Bank database and complemented by the IMF World Economic Outlook.

## 2.2 Summary Statistics

Table 1 provides summary statistics for Fed funds rate shocks and changes in the exchange rate and stock price.<sup>21</sup> Our sample consists of 90 FOMC announcement dates between 2000 and 2019.<sup>22</sup> Row (1) shows the summary statistics for the Fed funds rate shock estimated by [Nakamura and Steinsson \(2018\)](#). The Fed funds rate shock is defined as the change in market expectations of the Fed funds rate over the remainder of the month in which FOMC meetings occur. The shock is in terms of basis points, and a positive value implies a tightening surprise by the Federal Reserve. As [Nakamura and Steinsson \(2018\)](#) discuss, the magnitude of Fed funds rate shocks estimated by the high-frequency method is small: the standard deviation is 1.81 basis points.

Row (2) shows the summary statistics for the exchange rate depreciation, comparing before and after the FOMC announcement date.  $e_{c,t}$  is the spot exchange rate at the end of date  $t$  in the country  $c$ . The exchange rate is defined as the value of the US dollar in terms of local currency, so that a higher  $e_{c,t}$  implies the appreciation of the US dollar or depreciation of local currency. We take the change in the logarithm of the exchange rate from date  $t - 1$  to  $t + 1$ . Similarly, row (3) shows the summary statistics for the percentage change in the stock price, comparing before and after the FOMC announcement.  $p_{i,t}$  is the stock price of firm  $i$  at the end of date  $t$ . The stock price is denominated in local currency. The standard deviation of exchange rate change is 0.72 percent and that of stock return is 3.47 percent.<sup>23</sup>

Table 2 shows the frequency, amount, and sample period of interventions around the FOMC event

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<sup>20</sup>The limitation is that it is difficult to obtain firm-level data on invoicing currency of exports and imports for many countries. Hence, this paper focuses on the effect of FXIs on firms with dollar debt.

<sup>21</sup>Table 3 shows the sample of firms, which we will discuss later in this section.

<sup>22</sup>[Nakamura and Steinsson \(2018\)](#) and [Acosta \(2023\)](#) report 151 FOMC sample dates between 2000 and 2019. We exclude 46 dates that are characterized by a zero change in the Fed funds rate. This is because our main focus is the unexpected change in the Fed funds rate and the central banks' counteracting intervention against Fed funds rate shocks. In subsection 5.5, we also include those dates in the sample and show the result is robust. We also excluded 15 FOMC event dates with large FFR shocks so that our result is not affected by outliers (see footnote 23).

<sup>23</sup>We trimmed the top and bottom 5% of the Fed funds rate shocks and winsorized the top and bottom 5% of changes in the exchange rate and firms' stock prices in each country, so that our result is not affected by outliers.

dates in our sample countries. To consider the possibility that the effects of a Fed funds rate shock and FXIs accumulate over time, we consider a 5-day window after FOMC announcement dates.

We first define buying and selling intervention so that central banks buy or sell the US dollar at least once between dates  $t$  and  $t + 5$ , where,  $t$  is the FOMC announcement date. Columns (1) and (2) report the frequency of buying and selling US dollar interventions. There is a large variation in the frequency of interventions across countries. For example, Argentina intervened 59 times by buying the US dollar and 45 times by selling it, out of a total of 90 FOMC event dates in our sample. In contrast, Switzerland never intervened and Turkey intervened only once around the FOMC meetings. However, the intervention happened only outside the 5-day window around the meetings. To minimize the possibility that the intervention is affected by a myriad of other factors besides US monetary shocks, our sample does not count interventions that happened outside the 5-day window around FOMC meetings.

Column (3) reports the frequency of counteracting intervention, which is the main focus of our analysis. We define counteracting intervention as follows: if the Fed funds rate increases on date  $t$ , central banks sell the US dollar at least once and never buy the US dollar between dates  $t$  and  $t + 5$ , and vice versa when the Fed funds rate decreases. Since a higher Fed funds rate depreciates the local currency, central banks offset the depreciation by selling the US dollar and buying the local currency. Unless otherwise stated, we will use this definition of counteracting intervention throughout the regression analyses in this paper.<sup>24</sup> We find that not all interventions are counteracting interventions against the Fed. For example, Argentina intervened by buying the US dollar 59 times and by selling the US dollar 45 times, but only on 15 occasions did they intervene by counteracting the Fed funds rate shock. Focusing on these counter-interventions, we will study how the effects of FOMC announcements on the exchange rate and stock price are different when the central banks do and do not counter-intervene against Fed funds rate shocks. Columns (4) and (5) report the FXI volume in terms of millions of US dollars around the FOMC announcement dates. The mean and median FXI volumes across all countries are 57 million dollars and 15 million dollars, respectively.<sup>25</sup>

Column (6) reports the sample period when the FXI data are available. The availability of FXI data depends on the country. In particular, our sample only includes countries and time periods in which daily FXI data is available. We excluded time periods in which only monthly, quarterly, or annual data are available. For example, daily intervention data in Switzerland is available only until 2001.

Table 3 describes the sample of firms.<sup>26</sup> The table shows the total number of firms and the number of

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<sup>24</sup>Subsection 5.2 defines the counteracting intervention differently: the central banks' average net sales of US dollars between dates  $t$  and  $t + 5$  is positive when the Fed funds rate increases at date  $t$ , and vice versa when the Fed funds rate decreases. Our main results are robust to using this alternative definition.

<sup>25</sup>To calculate the mean and median FXI volumes around FOMC announcement dates, we first take the average of absolute values of FXI volumes between date  $t$  and  $t + 5$  for each FOMC announcement date  $t$ . Next, we take the mean and median of implied FXI volume over FOMC announcement dates, conditioning that there was at least one intervention between date  $t$  and  $t + 5$ .

<sup>26</sup>We omitted the following countries from our sample of firms: Turkey never conducted FXIs in 5-day windows around

firms that issued dollar debt at least once during the sample period in each country. Our sample consists of 4,060 firms in total, out of which 261 firms (6%) have dollar debt. The average share of dollar debt over total debt across all firms is 66%, conditional on firms issuing a positive amount of dollar debt. The share of firms with dollar debt is relatively large in emerging economies, while most of the Japanese firms do not issue dollar debt as they borrow in Japanese yen (if we exclude Japanese firms from the sample, 14% of firms have dollar debt).<sup>27,28</sup>

### 2.3 Identification of Unexpected FXIs

To elaborate on our identification strategy for FXIs, we estimate a central bank reaction function. The motivation is to extract the unexpected component of intervention that cannot be forecasted by Fed funds rate shocks, past exchange rate movements, FXIs before the FOMC events, and other macroeconomic characteristics. This is a popular approach to minimizing the endogeneity of intervention in the literature (Ito and Yabu 2007, Kearns and Rigobon 2005, Fatum and Hutchison 2010, Kuersteiner et al. 2018, Fratzscher et al. 2019) similar to residuals from a monetary policy Taylor rule. The advantage of the deviation from the FX policy rule relative to deviations from a monetary policy rule is that FX interventions vary on a daily level, while monetary policy decisions are usually only conducted every several weeks. The high-frequency FXI rule approach therefore more cleanly identifies surprises than that of Taylor rule residual.<sup>29</sup>

We consider the following FXI rule:

$$\widetilde{FXI}_{c,t} = \alpha + \sum_c \beta_c (FFR_t \times \gamma_c) + \delta Z_{c,t} + \gamma_c + \epsilon_{c,t}. \quad (1)$$

$\widetilde{FXI}_{c,t}$  is the indicator for counteracting intervention in country  $c$  on FOMC announcement date  $t$ , as discussed in column (3) of Table 2.  $\widetilde{FXI}_{c,t}$  takes 1 if the Fed tightens unexpectedly on date  $t$  and the central banks intervene by selling the US dollar at least once but never intervenes by buying the US dollar between dates  $t$  and  $t + 5$ . Similarly,  $\widetilde{FXI}_{c,t}$  takes  $-1$  if the Fed loosens unexpectedly on date  $t$  and the central banks intervene by buying the US dollar at least once but never intervenes by selling the US dollar between dates  $t$  and  $t + 5$ . Otherwise,  $\widetilde{FXI}_{c,t}$  takes zero.

$FFR_t$  is the Fed funds rate shock in terms of basis points, and  $\gamma_c$  is the fixed effect for each country  $c$ . Their interaction  $FFR_t \times \gamma_c$  captures the differential propensity to intervene against Fed funds rate

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FOMC announcement dates. In Switzerland, the daily FXI data was only available until 2001. In Costa Rica, Georgia, and Peru, there is very little data on corporate balance sheets.

<sup>27</sup>We define exporters as firms that report a positive amount of export at least once during the sample period since Worldscope has a missing value for export in some countries and time periods. Our sample contains 501 exporters (12% of all firms).

<sup>28</sup>To address the possibility where the result is driven by a particular country, in subsection 5.10, we exclude each single country from the regression and show the results on stock price and exchange rate are robust.

<sup>29</sup>For estimation of Taylor rule residual, see Taylor (2009), Maddaloni and Peydró (2011), and Dell’Ariccia et al. (2017).

shocks across countries.  $Z_{c,t}$  is the set of controls, including the trend and standard deviation of the exchange rate and the dummy for FXIs before the FOMC event date, as well as the macroeconomic variables (one-month lagged policy rate, one-year lagged GDP, CPI inflation rate, trade balance over GDP ratio, and unemployment rate), and the interaction of macroeconomic variables with Fed funds rate shock.<sup>30</sup> For past exchange rate movement, we took the percentage change and standard deviation of the exchange rate between dates  $t - 1$  and  $t - 5$ , where  $t$  is the FOMC event date. For past intervention, the dummy takes 1 if the average net purchase of US dollars between dates  $t - 1$  and  $t - 5$  is positive,  $-1$  if the net purchase is negative, and zero if there is no intervention.

The setup of the FXI rule is based on the previous empirical literature on FXIs. Following [Fratzscher et al. \(2019\)](#), we control for the past exchange rate trend and volatility and past interventions, as they can affect the central bank's decision to intervene. Moreover, based on [Fatum and Hutchison \(2010\)](#), we also control for macroeconomic variables, such as GDP and trade balance, since countries with different macroeconomic conditions may adopt different interventions. We use lagged macroeconomic variables to remove the simultaneity bias. We also account for the interaction between the Fed funds rate shock and macro variables, since countries with different macroeconomic characteristics can respond heterogeneously to the Fed funds rate shock. We include the country fixed effects,  $\gamma_c$ , to control for the difference in average exchange rate trends in each country.

The predicted counter-intervention from estimating the reaction function (1) can be interpreted as the expected component of counter-interventions, in other words, the average response of FXIs to Fed funds rate shocks, past exchange rates, interventions, and macroeconomic conditions. The residual, or the deviation from the FXI rule, can be interpreted as the unexpected component of FXIs. We exploit this residual as the exogenous surprise component of FXIs.

Figure 2 graphically illustrates the result for a variance decomposition from estimating Equation (1). Our estimates show that 24% of the variation in counter-intervention can be explained by the set of controls ( $R^2 = 0.24$ ), while the remaining 76% are unexplained. This low R-squared implies that a large part of FXIs cannot be predicted by the Fed funds rate shock, past exchange rates or interventions. If we further decompose the controls, 16% can be explained by the Fed funds rate shocks, 2% by macroeconomic variables (policy rate, GDP, CPI inflation rate, trade balance over GDP ratio, unemployment rate), 30% by the interaction between the Fed funds rate shock and macro variables, 35% by past interventions, and 17% by country fixed effects. The contribution of past exchange rate trends and volatility is almost zero, so it is not displayed in the figure. This is consistent with [Fratzscher et al. \(2019\)](#), who show that past exchange rates have very limited explanatory power for FXIs.

Having shown that the variation of interventions is difficult to predict, we will use the residual

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<sup>30</sup>We use a monthly policy rate since the daily policy rate is not available for all sample countries. In subsection 5.4, we use daily policy rates in countries with available data and show that our result is robust.

from estimating Equation (1) as an unexpected component of counter-intervention. To simplify the interpretation of results in later sections, we define an unexpected counter-intervention dummy,  $FXI_{c,t}$ . If the residual from estimating Equation (1) is greater than its median in absolute value,  $FXI_{c,t}$  takes one, and central banks counter-intervene unexpectedly against the Fed. Otherwise,  $FXI_{c,t}$  takes zero and central banks do not counter-intervene unexpectedly.<sup>31</sup> We will use this definition of unexpected counter-interventions throughout our analysis.

Figure 3 shows a simple graphical example of this identification methodology. Panel (a) shows an example of unexpected US monetary tightening: on November 15, 2000, the Fed tightened unexpectedly, and the Reserve Bank of Australia intervened by selling the US dollar. The counter-intervention dummy  $\widetilde{FXI}_{c,t}$  takes 1. The predicted value and residual from estimating the linear probability model (1) are around 0.2 and 0.8, respectively. This implies that the market expected that there was a 20% probability that the central bank would actually intervene against the Fed's tightening shock by selling the US dollar, but an 80% probability that the central bank would not intervene. This large residual implies that the intervention was mostly unexpected. Similarly, panel (b) shows the example of unexpected US monetary easing: on March 22, 2005, the Fed delivered an accommodating monetary policy shock, and the Central Bank of Argentina intervened by buying the US dollar. The counter-intervention dummy  $\widetilde{FXI}_{c,t}$  takes  $-1$ . The predicted value and residual from estimating the linear probability model (1) are around  $-0.39$  and  $-0.61$ , respectively. This implies that the market expected that the probability that the central bank would not intervene against the US monetary easing shock was more than 60% (the residual is 0.61 in absolute value). This suggests that the degree to which the intervention is unexpected can be measured using the absolute value of the residual from estimating equation (1). To simplify the interpretation, in the baseline analysis, we define the intervention as unexpected if the residual is larger than its median in absolute value.

### 3 Empirical Strategy

Our empirical strategy relies on a high-frequency event-study approach that examines the performance of equities and exchange rates around FOMC meetings. The event study approach has the advantage that the market reaction on FOMC dates is likely due to monetary policy itself, rather than other confounding factors that could influence equity prices or the exchange rate. For instance, in a simple time-series regression in which quarterly outcome variables are regressed on US monetary policy (shocks), it is more difficult to identify the causal effect of monetary policy as many confounding factors could be the reason for the market reaction that is not due to monetary policy itself. If the monetary policy shock is completely exogenous, the coefficient may not be biased, but aggregating high-frequency monetary

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<sup>31</sup>Subsection 5.2 shows that our results are robust even if we use different definitions for the unexpected counter-intervention.

policy shocks to the quarterly level may cause a “power issue”, similar to a weak instrumental variable problem in two-stage least squares regressions.

We start with event-study local projections (Jordà 2005) by estimating the following sequence of regressions across FOMC dates:

$$y_{i(c),t+h} - y_{i(c),t-1} = \beta_h FFR_t + \mathbf{X}\delta_x^h + \alpha_{i(c)}^h + \epsilon_{i(c),t}^h, \quad \forall h \in [-5, 5] \quad (2)$$

where  $FFR_t$  is the Fed funds rate shocks developed by Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) and Acosta (2023). The shock is defined as the change in the Fed funds futures rate in a 30-minute window around the FOMC announcement.  $FFR_t$  is in terms of basis points, and positive  $FFR_t$  represents the unexpected increase in the Fed funds rate.  $y_{i(c),t+h}$  is the stock price of a firm  $i$  based in the country  $c$ ,  $h$  days after the FOMC meeting.  $\alpha_{i(c)}^h$  is a firm fixed effect. The standard errors are always double-clustered at the firm and event date level to account for correlation at the same firm and time.  $\beta_h$  is the effect of the Fed funds rate shock on the equal-weighted stock price  $h$  days after the FOMC meeting. Equation 2 is informative about the spillover effects of US monetary policy across all countries in our sample and across firms.  $\beta < 0$  for each  $h \geq 0$  implies that a surprise tightening of US monetary policy reduces stock prices abroad  $h$  days after the meeting. Then we can estimate Equation 2 for the country-FOMC date subsamples with and without unexpected counter-interventions ( $FXI_{c,t} = 1$  and  $FXI_{c,t} = 0$ ). For the subsample  $FXI_{c,t} = 1$ ,  $\beta = 0$  implies that monetary policy does not spill over negatively to countries’ equally-weighted stock price index  $h$  days after the meeting if they counter-intervene against the Fed.  $\mathbf{X}$  are a set of controls that include the one-year lagged export intensity, total asset, liquidity-to-asset ratio, firm age (firm-level), one-year lagged import content of production (industry-level), and their interactions with Fed funds rate shock.

We consider two modifications to evaluate the effect of FXIs. First, we introduce an interaction term between the Federal funds rate shock and a dummy of whether a firm held US dollar debt in the previous year ( $USD_{i(c),y-1(t)}$ ):

$$y_{i(c),t+h} - y_{i(c),t-1} = \gamma_h FFR_t \times USD_{i(c),y-1(t)} + \mathbf{X}\delta_x^h + \alpha_{i(c)}^h + \alpha_{c,t}^h + \epsilon_{i(c),t}^h, \quad \forall h \in [-5, 5] \quad (3)$$

$\gamma_h$  can be interpreted as a state-dependent effect of the monetary policy shock, where the state is whether firms have US dollar debt or not (Cloyne et al. 2023).  $USD_{i(c),y-1(t)}$  is a dummy if a firm has had US dollar debt in the year before the FOMC meeting.  $\alpha_{c,t}^h$  is a country-time fixed effect and  $\alpha_{i(c)}^h$  is a firm fixed effect.  $\gamma$  captures the balance sheet channel of US monetary spillover.  $\gamma < 0$  for each  $h \geq 0$  implies that a surprise tightening of US monetary policy reduces the stock price of firms with dollar debt relative to those without dollar debt.



Next, we introduce an interaction term between the Federal funds rate shock and the intervention:

$$y_{i(c),t+h} - y_{i(c),t-1} = \beta_h \text{FFR}_t + \Omega_h \text{FXI}_{c,t} + \gamma_h \text{FFR}_t \times \text{FXI}_{c,t} + \mathbf{X} \delta_x^h + \alpha_{i(c)}^h + \epsilon_{i(c),t}^h, \quad \forall h \in [-5, 5] \quad (4)$$

$\gamma$  captures the effect of FXIs mitigating the effect of US monetary spillover.  $\gamma > 0$  for each  $h \geq 0$  implies that the decline in stock price is smaller with FXIs than the case without FXIs. In contrast to standard local projections, we also consider  $h < 0$  in the spirit of an LP-DID proposed by [Dube et al. \(2023\)](#). One difference between the LP-DID and the standard DID is that a sequence of regressions is estimated for each  $h$ . This has the advantage that  $\beta_h$  is unaffected by the choice of the number of lags and leads included. Moreover, the LP-DID avoids several other problems compared to estimating a difference-in-differences specification with two-way fixed effects, see, e.g., [Callaway and Sant'Anna \(2021\)](#), [Goodman-Bacon \(2021\)](#) among many others.

For the difference-in-differences estimator to be unbiased, we require the parallel trend assumption to be satisfied—that is, absent a shock, treated and control firms would have evolved the same way. While it is not possible to test this assumption, as the counterfactual post-FOMC behavior without the shock is unobservable, we can test whether there are differential pre-trends before the shock. Estimating  $\beta_h$  for  $h < 0$  allows us to test whether there is a violation of the parallel trend assumption.

Recent literature has argued that DID designs are likely to be biased in the presence of a staggered DiD approach, as already treated units can act as effective comparison units ([Baker et al. 2022](#)). Note that this is not a concern in our setting as we set  $h \in [-5, 5]$ , covering only a window of 10 days, which prevents overlapping observations and staggered treatment, as FOMC meetings only occur approximately every six weeks. The concern would be that firms with US dollar debt are treated for one FOMC meeting but not for the next, but would still be treated as comparison units for the next one.

We start by estimating Equations 2 and 3 separately for FOMC meetings when country  $c$  counter-intervenes in the FX market after the FOMC meeting, based on the definition in section 2. Focusing on no-counter-intervention events allows us to test the degree and channels of US monetary policy spillovers if countries do not intervene against the Fed. Instead, focusing on counter-intervention events allows us to test whether US monetary policy spills over to firms' stock prices if a country intervenes against the Fed. In particular, if we can reject the null hypothesis that  $\beta = 0$  in Equation 2, the data favors the alternative hypothesis that there exists a spillover effect of US monetary policy. If we cannot reject  $\beta = 0$ , there are likely no spillover effects. In Equation 3, the null hypothesis is that firms with US dollar debt are not differentially affected by a US monetary spillover, while the alternative hypothesis is that they are differentially affected. The alternative hypothesis,  $\gamma < 0$ , can be interpreted as a US monetary policy-driven balance sheet channel of depreciation.

The disadvantage of splitting the data into intervention and no-intervention events is that we cannot

test whether  $\beta$  and  $\gamma$  are statistically different for interventions and non-intervention events. It is possible that when estimating the equations separately, we can reject the null hypothesis in one subsample but not in the other, yet due to large standard errors, the two situations are not different from each other in a statistically significant manner.

We therefore refine our regression equation by including the counter-intervention dummy specifically in the regression equation instead of splitting between situations when  $FXI_{c,t}$  is either zero or one:

$$y_{i(c),t+h} - y_{i(c),t-1} = \theta_h \text{FFR}_t \times \text{USD}_{i(c),y-1(t)} \times \text{FXI}_{c,t} + \gamma_h \text{FFR}_t \times \text{USD}_{i(c),y-1(t)} \\ + \mathbf{X} \delta_x^h + \alpha_{i(c)}^h + \alpha_{c,t}^h + \epsilon_{i(c),t}^h, \quad \forall h \in [-5, 5] \quad (5)$$

In Equation 5 the coefficient  $\gamma$  has the same interpretation as in the equation without the triple interaction (Equation 3) when estimating in the sample of no-intervention: the relative performance of firms with US dollar debt in response to a contractionary US monetary policy shock when the country does not counter-intervene. A negative coefficient implies that firms with US dollar debt underperform relative to those with US dollar debt. The triple interaction coefficient  $\theta$  measures the marginal effect of FXIs for firms with US dollar debt in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock. A positive coefficient  $\theta$  implies that FXIs lead to relatively higher stock prices for firms with US dollar debt in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock, compared to a counterfactual under which the central bank does not counter-intervene.  $\theta$  can therefore be interpreted as the extent to which FXIs mute the US monetary policy-induced balance sheet channel of exchange rate depreciation, while  $\gamma$  measures the extent of the balance sheet channel without intervention. Summing  $\theta$  and  $\gamma$  can be equivalently interpreted as Equation 3 for  $FXI_{c,t} = 1$  as the balance sheet channel when countries intervene.  $\theta + \gamma = 0$  implies FXIs entirely mute the balance sheet channel.

Note that estimating the relative stock market response of having US dollar debt in response to the monetary policy shock allows us to saturate the regression specification with country-time fixed effects ( $\alpha_{c,t}$ ). Country-time fixed effects control for time-variant observed and unobserved characteristics at the country level, such as the movement of the exchange rates or the effect on the average stock price around the US FOMC meetings. The inclusion of country-time fixed effects implies that the effect of  $\text{FFR}_t$  is not identified, as it is collinear with the fixed effects. Hence, when controlling for time-variant observed and unobserved characteristics at the country level through country-time fixed effects, we can only make a relative statement about having US dollar debt. In an alternative specification, we remove the country-time fixed effects from the regression specification to evaluate the total effect of US monetary policy shocks for both firms with and without dollar debt, with the caveat of controlling for fewer potential confounding factors.

## 4 Results

### 4.1 Stock Market

We begin by estimating Equation 2 separately for firms with and without US dollar debt, i.e., meaning that  $(USD_{i(c),y-t(t)} = 1 \text{ and } 0)$ . Table 4 shows the result, where panels (a) and (b) show the result with and without FXIs, respectively. We first study the case without FXIs ( $FXI_{c,t} = 0$ ). Panel (a), columns (1) and (2) report the estimated  $\beta_1$  coefficient for a subsample of firms with and without dollar debt, respectively, based in countries without FXIs. Column (1) shows that, if central banks do not counter-intervene against the Fed, an unexpected increase in the Fed funds rate reduces the stock price for firms with dollar debt in a statistically significant manner (6.6% in response to a 10bp surprise hike).<sup>32</sup> However, if firms do not have dollar debt, the decline in stock price is mitigated (0.9%). Next, to test if the difference in the response between firms with and without dollar debt is significant, we estimate Equation 3 in countries without interventions. Column (3) reports the estimated  $\beta_1$  and  $\gamma_1$  coefficients for countries without interventions. The negative  $\gamma_1$  coefficient shows that when the Fed funds rate increases, the decline in stock prices for firms with dollar debt is significantly larger than for those without dollar debt (3.1pp larger decline). Moreover, in column (4), we include the country-time fixed effect  $\alpha_{c,t}^h$ , which captures the time-varying observable and unobservable characteristics at the country-level, and our result remains robust. Note that  $\alpha_{c,t}^h$  absorbs the  $FFR_t$  standalone term. These results suggest a strong negative balance sheet channel driven by US monetary tightening without FXIs.<sup>33</sup>

In contrast, panel (b) conducts a similar exercise with FXIs ( $FXI_{c,t} = 1$ ). Column (1) shows that, if central banks counter-intervene against the Fed's surprise hike, the decline of stock prices is mitigated even if firms have dollar debt (2.2% in response to 10bp surprise hike, in contrast to 6.6% in panel (a)).<sup>34</sup> Columns (3) and (4) show the differential response of firms with and without dollar debt. The coefficient  $\gamma_1$  is small and statistically insignificant, implying that if central banks counter-intervene against the Fed, the stock price response of firms with dollar debt is not different from those without dollar debt in a statistically significant manner. This suggests that FXIs can successfully mute the negative spillover of US monetary shocks via the balance sheet channel, disproportionately benefiting firms with dollar debt.

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<sup>32</sup>As shown in Table 1, the standard deviation of the monetary shock in our sample is very small (1.81bp) since it is measured in a 30-minute window around the FOMC announcement. In fact, in the dataset of Nakamura and Steinsson (2018), there are only six FOMC announcement dates in our sample period (between 2000 and 2019) when the magnitude of the Fed funds rate shock is greater than or equal to 10bp in absolute value. Hence, a 10bp monetary shock can be interpreted as a large shock.

<sup>33</sup>The limitation for our analysis is that we do not have data on firms' derivative use. For firms that perfectly hedge their currency risk, we would expect the stock price to be unaffected around FOMC announcements, similar to those firms with no US dollar debt. This suggests that our results are lower-bound estimates of the effect of FXIs since controlling for hedging would further strengthen the negative stock price spillover of US monetary shocks. Moreover, the effects would likely be small, as only a very small share of firms use derivatives. For instance, Casas et al. (2022) show that only 2.9% of Colombian firms use FX derivatives.

<sup>34</sup>Even with FXIs, the decline in stock prices is statistically significant. This can be due to other channels: for example, a higher US interest rate reduces the demand for domestic goods via intertemporal substitution.

Next, to test whether the effect of FXIs is large in a statistically significant manner, we estimate Equation 4 separately for firms with and without dollar debt. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 report the estimated  $\beta_1$  and  $\gamma_1$  coefficients for firms with and without dollar debt, respectively. Column (1) shows that, if firms have dollar debt, a surprise hike in the Fed funds rate reduces the stock price without intervention (6.4% in response to a 10bp hike), implying a negative balance sheet channel of US monetary policy. However, if central banks intervene, the decline in the stock price is mitigated by 4.5bp, implying that FXIs can mitigate this balance sheet channel. In column (2), we conduct a similar exercise for firms without dollar debt and find that the effects of the US monetary shock and FXIs are small. Finally, in columns (3) and (4), we estimate the triple interaction (Equation 5) to study whether the effect of FXIs is greater for firms with dollar debt. The negative coefficient on  $FFR_t \times USD_{i(c),y-1(t)}$  ( $\gamma = -0.310$ ) implies a negative balance sheet channel due to US monetary policy spillovers. However, the coefficient on  $FXI_{c,t} \times FFR_t \times USD_{i(c),y-1(t)}$  is positive ( $\theta = 0.324$ ) and  $\theta + \gamma = 0$  holds statistically. This result implies that FXIs entirely mute the balance sheet channel. The finding is robust even after including the country-time fixed effect (column 4). Note that  $\alpha_{c,t}^h$  absorbs the terms  $FFR_t$ ,  $FXI_{c,t}$ , and  $FFR_t \times FXI_{c,t}$ .

To test whether the effect of FXIs is persistent over time, we estimate Equation 2 over a 5-day window around the FOMC announcement. Figure 4, panel (a) plots the estimated coefficient  $\beta_h$  for all  $h \in [-5, 5]$ . The red and blue lines show the results for countries with and without FXIs, respectively. Without FXIs, a 10 basis point surprise increase in the Fed funds rate leads to an immediate decline in stock prices, and this accumulates up to nearly 1% after three days, suggesting that the balance sheet channel of US monetary shocks is persistent. However, if countries intervene, the effect of the US monetary surprise is smaller, and it disappears five days after the shock. Importantly, the near-zero coefficients for  $h < 0$  suggest that there is little difference in the pre-trends of stock prices in countries with and without FXIs, potentially suggesting that the post-FOMC differential response of stock prices is driven causally by FXIs. To test if the effect of FXIs is large in a statistically significant manner, in panel (b), we estimate Equation 4 and plot the coefficient  $\gamma_h$  for all  $h \in [-5, 5]$ .  $\gamma_h > 0$  for  $h > 0$  implies that FXIs can successfully mute the persistently negative balance sheet effects of US monetary shocks. In panels (c) and (d), we repeat a similar exercise for firms without dollar debt. The graph shows that the US monetary shock and FXIs have little effect on the stock price of firms without dollar debt. Finally, to compare the effect of FXIs on firms with and without dollar debt, we estimate Equation 5 for all  $h \in [-5, 5]$ . Figure 5 plots the estimated coefficient  $\theta_h$ .  $\theta_h > 0$  for  $h > 0$  suggests that the effect of FXIs is persistently greater for firms with dollar debt.

## 4.2 Mechanism: Exchange Rate

To further understand the balance sheet channel, we study the effect of FXIs on the exchange rate. Our previous results suggest that US monetary tightenings without FXIs have a negative balance sheet effect on firms with dollar debt, but FXIs can mute this spillover. For this result to be true, it must be the case that a US monetary tightening depreciates local exchange rates when countries do not counter-intervene but does not depreciate them when they actually counter-intervene. This is because the local depreciation increases the repayment of US dollar debt in terms of local currency and tightens the balance sheet of firms with US dollar debt.

To check this hypothesis, we estimate Equation 2, where now the dependent variable is replaced with the change in the log of the exchange rate in the country  $c$  between dates  $t - 1$  and  $t + 1$ . The exchange rate is defined as the value of one US dollar in terms of local currency, so that higher values imply an appreciation of the US dollar or a depreciation of local currency.  $\beta > 0$  implies that a surprise tightening of US monetary policy depreciates the local exchange rate  $h$  days after the meeting. We control for the trend and standard deviation of the exchange rate before the FOMC announcement date, FXIs before the FOMC announcement date, the one-month lagged policy rate, one-year lagged GDP, inflation, the trade balance over GDP ratio, the unemployment rate, and their interaction with the Fed funds rate shock.

In Table 6, columns (1) and (2) show the results for countries with and without intervention, respectively. If the local monetary authorities do not intervene, when the Fed unexpectedly hikes interest rates, the domestic currency depreciates in a statistically significant manner (by 2.25% in response to a 10bp surprise hike). However, if local policymakers counter-intervene in the FX market by selling the US dollar, the exchange rate remains flat around the FOMC meetings. To check that the effect of FXIs is large enough, in column (3), we estimate Equation 4 after replacing the dependent variable with a change in the exchange rate. Without interventions, a 10bp surprise hike in the Fed funds rate leads to a 2.01% exchange rate depreciation. However, if central banks counter-intervene by selling the US dollar, the depreciation is reduced by 2.02% compared to a scenario without any counter-intervention, and this difference is statistically significant. Thus, interventions offset the exchange rate depreciation caused by the Fed's surprise.

To study how the effect of FXIs accumulates over time, we reestimate Equation 2 for all  $h \in [-5, 5]$ . Figure 6, panel (a) plots the estimates of  $\beta_h$  coefficient. Before the FOMC meeting, there is little difference in exchange rates between countries with and without FXIs. However, while countries that do not counter-intervene by selling the US dollar experience persistent depreciations, those that counter-intervene do not experience a depreciation.<sup>35</sup> Moreover, to compare the trends of exchange rates around FOMC meetings in countries with and without FXIs, panel (b) reestimates the  $\gamma_h$  coefficient in Equation 4 for

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<sup>35</sup>The depreciation builds up slightly over time, consistent with [Roussanov and Wang \(2023\)](#).

the exchange rate.  $\gamma_h < 0$  for  $h > 0$  implies that the exchange rate depreciates less when the central banks counter-intervene against the Fed compared to a no intervention case.<sup>36</sup> These results suggest that FXIs are successful in stabilizing the exchange rate in response to unexpected monetary shocks, giving further support to the balance sheet stabilization channel of FXIs for firms with dollar debt.

### 4.3 Expenditure Switching Channel

In the previous sections, we have shown that FXIs benefit firms with dollar debt by muting the negative balance sheet channel of US monetary tightenings. However, a US tightening may also have other spillover effects, most importantly via exporting firms. On the one hand, depreciations induced by contractionary US monetary policy may increase foreigners' demand for exports due to lower relative prices (expenditure switching channel). On the other hand, a US monetary tightening may reduce US demand for goods and thus the demand for exports (a negative demand channel). If FXIs mute the depreciation-induced expenditure switching channel, but do not mute the negative demand channel due to intertemporal substitution, we would expect FXIs to be costly for exporters.

To check this possibility, we study the effect of FXIs on exporters and non-exporters. In Figure 7, we conduct a similar exercise to Figure 4 for exporters and non-exporters. Interestingly, although we do find some suggestive evidence for expenditure switching channels, the effect is quantitatively small. Figure 7, panel (a) studies the stock price response to Fed hikes for exporters in countries with and without FXIs, respectively. When the Fed tightens, the stock price response for exporters increases without FXIs but decreases with FXIs. However, the magnitude of the stock price decline is small (3.2% at the trough in response to the 10bp US hike) and the statistical significance is low. In contrast, Figure 4 suggests that stock prices for firms with dollar debt decrease significantly without FXIs (9.0% at the trough), and FXIs mitigate this decline. Next, panel (b) plots the interaction coefficient between FXIs and the export indicator. We show that FXIs decrease the stock price response for exporters compared to cases without FXIs. However, the effect is statistically significant only two days after the FOMC announcement, and the significance disappears five days after the event. However, Figure 4, panel (b) suggests that FXIs have an immediate positive impact on firms with dollar debt on the FOMC announcement date and the effect is persistent over time. Our estimates suggest that, although FXIs have the cost of mitigating expenditure switching channels for firms that export, the benefits for firms with US dollar debt are larger. Ultimately, it may depend on the composition of firms whether FXIs increase or decrease stock prices in the aggregate. For countries in which a large share of firms borrow in US dollars, the positive effect may dominate, but for countries with a large exporting sector, the negative effects could be substantial.

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<sup>36</sup>The effect of FXIs is statistically significant one day after the intervention. This is potentially due to the difference in time zones. Since the United States is one of the most western countries in the world, the FOMC announcement does not affect the exchange rate in eastern countries, such as Japan, on the same date. The limitation of our research is that we do not have data on the exact timing of FXIs in each country.

## 4.4 Foreign Exchange Reserves

Central banks' foreign exchange (FX) reserves have increased significantly over the last decades. Figure 8 shows the volume of FX reserves and the FX reserves over GDP ratio in our sample of countries. In the 1990s, FX reserves were low (roughly 0.21 trillion US dollars), and countries had limited instruments to insulate themselves from US monetary spillovers. However, reserves have increased by a magnitude of around 18 since the 1990s, reaching a peak of 3.91 trillion dollars in 2021. The FX reserve-to-GDP ratio also grew from 4.3% in 1990 to a peak of 32.5% in 2020. So far in 2022, the tightening of US monetary policy has not yet had severe negative consequences for emerging market economies, raising the question of whether FXIs are more effective when countries have relatively large FX reserves, as they can sell off those accumulated reserves to prevent sudden depreciations of exchange rates during times of crisis.

To test this hypothesis, we study the effects of FXIs on exchange rates and stock prices in countries with heterogeneous degrees of FX reserves. We use annual data on total FX reserves in IMF International Financial Statistics.<sup>37</sup> We define large and small FX reserves if the volume of FX reserves is larger or smaller than the median, respectively.

In Table 7, columns (1) and (2) estimate Equation 4 for exchange rates in countries with large and small reserves, respectively. We find that, in countries with large FX reserves, a 10bp Fed hike leads to a 2.5% depreciation in the exchange rate, but the depreciation is fully stable when the country intervenes. However, in countries with small FX reserves, the effect of FXIs is reduced to 1.6% and it is statistically less significant. Similarly, columns (3) and (4) estimate Equation 5 for stock prices of firms based in countries with large and small reserves, respectively. An increase in the Fed funds rate leads to a decline in stock prices for firms with dollar debt relative to those without dollar debt. FXIs mitigate this balance-sheet spillover in countries with large FX reserves (4.2pp), but the effect is weaker in countries with small FX reserves (1.3pp). Columns (5) and (6) show this result is robust even after including country-date fixed effects. These results suggest that FX reserve accumulation plays a crucial self-insurance role in mitigating US monetary spillovers.

## 5 Robustness Checks

This section provides robustness checks to confirm the balance sheet channel of FXIs. In Tables 8 and 9, we reestimate Equation 5 for stock prices under various alternative settings. The negative coefficient on  $FFR_t \times USD_{i(c),y-1(t)}$  implies a balance sheet channel of US monetary policy shocks, while the

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<sup>37</sup>The dataset provides total FX reserves at a country-level, but the currency composition of reserves is only available at the world-level. [Iancu et al. \(2020\)](#) and [Ito and McCauley \(2020\)](#) provide data on the currency composition of FX reserves. Since the currency composition data is not available for all of our sample countries, we use the total FX reserves data.

positive coefficient on  $FXI_{c,t} \times FFR_t \times USD_{i(c),y-1(t)}$  implies that FXIs can mute the balance sheet channel. Similarly, in Table 10, we reestimate Equation 4 after replacing the dependent variable with exchange rate depreciation. The positive coefficient on  $FFR_t$  implies that the US tightening depreciates the local exchange rate, while the negative coefficient on  $FFR_t \times FXI_{c,t}$  implies that FXIs mitigate this depreciation.

## 5.1 Intensive and Extensive Margins of dollar debt

The baseline result on the balance sheet channel focuses on whether firms borrow in US dollars (extensive margin). However, in reality, the effect of interventions may also depend on how much they borrow in dollars (intensive margin). Firms with large amounts of dollar debt would be more exposed to currency risk than those with small amounts of dollar debt. To test this intensive margin, we define an indicator variable for “low dollar debt,” which takes one if the firms’ share of dollar debt over total debt is larger than the 25th percentile (conditional on having a positive amount of dollar debt) and zero otherwise (including firms with dollar debt lower than the 25th percentile and firms without dollar debt).<sup>38</sup> Similarly, we define dummies for “high dollar debt” for firms with a median dollar debt share, and “all dollar debt” for firms that only issue dollar debt but do not issue debt in other currencies.<sup>39</sup> This definition can capture the right tail of the distribution of the dollar debt share across firms.

Table 8 shows the result. Comparing columns (1)-(3), we find that both the balance sheet channel of US monetary policy shocks (negative coefficient  $\gamma$  on  $FFR_t \times USD_{i(c),y-1(t)}$ ) and FXIs’ mitigation of monetary spillovers (positive coefficient  $\theta$  on  $FXI_{c,t} \times FFR_t \times USD_{i(c),y-1(t)}$ ) are the strongest for firms with high dollar debt ( $\gamma = -0.345$ ,  $\theta = 0.468$ ) and the weakest for those with low dollar debt ( $\gamma = -0.303$ ,  $\theta = 0.293$ ).

Moreover, instead of a dummy variable for large dollar debt, we take the continuous share of dollar debt over total debt. The dollar debt share is standardized so that one unit of dollar debt share corresponds to one standard deviation (around 12.2%). Column (4) shows that, when the share of dollar debt is higher by one standard deviation, a 10bp increase in the Fed funds rate leads to 0.43% decline in stock price without FXIs. However, when the central bank intervenes, this decline is mitigated by 0.44%, entirely offsetting the effect of the US monetary shock. These results imply that US monetary shocks and FXIs have a large effect, especially on firms with large dollar debt.

<sup>38</sup>We also check that the result is robust with a continuous measure of dollar debt over total debt.

<sup>39</sup>Conditioning on firms with positive dollar debt, around 29% of our firm-date observations are driven by firms only with dollar debt. Hence, the 75th percentile of dollar debt share corresponds to “all dollar debt.”



## 5.2 Alternative Definitions for Unexpected Counter-Intervention

We study different criteria for defining unexpected counteracting interventions. In the benchmark case, a counteracting intervention is defined so that, if the Fed funds rate increases on date  $t$ , central banks sell the US dollar at least once and never buy the US dollar between dates  $t$  and  $t + 5$ , and vice versa when the Fed funds rate decreases. Then, we estimate Equation 1 and define an unexpected counter-intervention if the residual is larger than its median in absolute value. While we use this definition in the benchmark results to simplify the interpretation, we also try alternative definitions for an unexpected counter-intervention.

First, we define a counter-intervention as occurring when the central banks' average net sales of US dollars between dates  $t$  and  $t + 5$  are positive in case the Fed funds rate increases on date  $t$ , and vice versa when the Fed funds rate decreases. Second, a counter-intervention is defined as unexpected if the residual from estimating Equation 1 is larger than the 75 percentile rather than the median in absolute value. Third, we use the volume of FXIs in terms of the FXI-over-GDP ratio in the first-stage regression (Equation 1), instead of using the counter-intervention dummy. We winsorized the top and bottom 5% of FXI-over-GDP ratio. Columns (1)-(3) of Tables 9 and 10 show the results under these four alternative definitions. Comparing these findings with column (3) of Tables 4 and 6, we confirm our results on stock prices and exchange rates to be robust. Without FXIs, a US monetary tightening shock depreciates the exchange rate and reduces the stock price for firms with dollar debt, but FXIs mitigate this effect.

## 5.3 Size of Intervention

Our baseline specification is whether central banks counter-intervene against unexpected Fed hikes or not. However, as shown in Table 2, the size of FXIs is heterogeneous across countries. We will test whether our main result holds even if we focus on relatively large FXIs and exclude relatively small FXIs. For each country and FOMC event date, we first calculate the average net purchase of the US dollar over GDP ratio between  $t$  and  $t + 5$ , where  $t$  is the FOMC event date. We then define large and small FXIs if the average net purchase is larger or smaller than the 25 percentile in absolute value, respectively. We then exclude small FXIs from our sample. Column (4) of Tables 9 and 10 shows that our result is robust even after focusing on large FXIs.

## 5.4 Sterilized Interventions

We further investigate the effect of sterilized interventions. Sterilization implies that central banks conduct an open market operation to offset the effect of FXIs on the domestic financial market. We control for daily monetary policy rates in order to separate out the effect of monetary policy and focus

on the FX purchases or sales by central banks.<sup>40</sup> In the benchmark result, we use monthly data on policy rates since the monthly data are available for all sample countries, but daily data are not. In this section, we instead use the daily policy rate for a subsample of countries where the data is available.<sup>41</sup> We control for daily policy rates both in the first-step and second-step regressions. Column (5) of Tables 9 and 10 shows that our result is robust after controlling for daily policy rates.

## 5.5 FOMC Event Dates with Zero FFR Shocks

In the baseline analysis, we used 90 FOMC event dates with nonzero changes in the Fed funds rate, since our main focus is the counteracting intervention against unexpected changes in US monetary policy. Here, we also include 46 additional FOMC event dates with zero changes in the Fed funds rate. Column (6) of Tables 9 and 10 shows that our result is robust even after including these dates.

## 5.6 Excluding Global Financial Crisis

To check the possibility that our result is affected by a particular event, most notably the global financial crisis, we exclude the period between 2007 and 2009 from our sample. Column (7) of Tables 9 and 10 shows that our result is robust after excluding the financial crisis.

## 5.7 Debt Maturity

To further refine our identification strategy, we use the firms' debt maturity structure. If firms happen to have dollar debt whose maturity is around unexpected Fed hikes, the cost of rolling over debt increases. However, if the debt does not mature around the FOMC events, the effect on rollover costs is negligible. Hence, FXIs that counteract Fed hikes should disproportionately benefit firms with dollar debt that matures around the FOMC announcement dates. Since the maturity structure is exogenous to exchange rate movement, the stock price response can potentially be interpreted in a causal way.

To test this hypothesis, we divide the dollar debt into maturing and non-maturing dollar debt. Maturing dollar debt is defined as the debt whose repayment currency is the US dollar and which matures within a one-year window around (six months before or after) the FOMC announcement date. Non-maturing dollar debt is defined as dollar debt that does not mature within a one-year window around the announcement. We redefine the dummy for dollar debt,  $USD_{i(c),y-1(t)}$ , so that it takes one if firms have maturing dollar debt in the previous year and zero if firms do not (including firms with

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<sup>40</sup>We do not have information on whether the intervention is sterilized or unsterilized. As discussed in [Fratzscher et al. \(2020\)](#), given that FXIs are a distinct policy tool from the interest rate, it is reasonable to assume that interventions in our sample are generally sterilized.

<sup>41</sup>The data on daily policy rates is available in the following ten countries (out of the total 13 in our sample): Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, Japan, Mexico, Turkey, and Peru. The data source is BIS statistics. We took the logarithm of daily policy rates since Argentina and Turkey have high policy rates.

non-maturing dollar debt but without maturing dollar debt, and firms with no dollar debt). Table 9, column (8) shows that US monetary tightenings reduce stock prices for firms with maturing dollar debt without interventions, but do not decrease it with interventions.

We further compare this result with the benchmark case. In Table 5, column (3) shows that, without FXIs, a 10bp increase in the Fed funds rate leads to a 3.1pp decline in stock prices for firms with dollar debt (compared to those without dollar debt), while FXIs mitigate this decline by 3.2pp. However, in Table 9, column (8) shows that the same increase in the Fed funds rate leads to a 6.7pp decline in stock prices without FXIs and a 6.2% mitigation with FXIs. This suggests that the balance sheet channel of US monetary shocks and FXIs is particularly strong for firms with maturing dollar debt; thus, FXIs disproportionately benefit firms with maturing dollar debt compared to firms with non-maturing dollar debt.

## **5.8 Controlling for International Sales and Asset Holdings**

In the baseline results on stock prices, we control for exports and imports because they affect firms' foreign currency revenue and cost. There are other factors that potentially affect firms' foreign currency revenue, including international sales and international assets, as firms with international sales or assets may benefit from a domestic currency depreciation. To take this into account, we control for the one-year lagged international sales over total sales ratio and the international assets over total asset ratio. The data is available in Worldscope. In Table 9, column (9) shows the result is robust after including these additional controls.

## **5.9 Currency Denomination of Stock Prices**

In the baseline analysis, the firm's stock price is denominated in local currency. In this section, we denominate the stock price in US dollars so that changes in exchange rates affect the valuation of stock prices. When the Fed funds rate increases, not only do stock prices decrease for firms with dollar debt, but the exchange rate depreciates against the dollar as well. Hence, we expect that the stock price in terms of the US dollar decreases more than the one denominated in local currency. This implies that firms with dollar debt are riskier investment opportunities for US international investors compared to local investors. Table 9, column (10) shows that when the stock price is denominated in the US dollar, a 10bp Fed tightening without FXIs decreases the relative stock price for firms with dollar debt by 3.8bp, while FXIs mitigate this decline by 3.8bp. Those effects are greater than the benchmark case in Table 4, column (3), where the stock price is denominated in local currency.

## 5.10 Other Robustness Tests

We conduct several other robustness tests. First, to take into account the difference in the number of firms with dollar debt across countries, we weight the regression by the number of firms with dollar debt in each country. In Figure A1, we reproduce Figure 4, panels (a) and (b) after weighting the regression by  $1/n_{i(c)}$ , where  $n_{i(c)}$  is the number of firms with dollar debt in country  $c$  where firm  $i$  belongs. The result is qualitatively similar to the benchmark case.

Next, to address the concern that our result is driven by one particular country, we exclude each sample country from regression and show the result is robust. Each line in Figure A2, panels (a) and (b) show the estimates of Equations 2 after excluding each country from our sample. Without FXI, a Fed funds hike leads to a decline in stock price for firms with dollar debt (panel a), while the stock price remains stable with FXI (panel b). Next, Figure A2, panel (c) shows the estimates of Equations 4 after excluding each country from our sample. We learn that there is a positive difference in stock price response between the case without and with FXI. These results are consistent with the benchmark case in Figure 4. Figure A3 conducts a similar exercise for exchange rate. Panels (a) and (b) show that exchange rate depreciates after Fed funds hike without FXI, while it remains stable with FXI. Figure A3, panel (c) shows the the difference in exchange rate responses without and without FXI. These results are consistent with the benchmark case in Figure 6.

## 6 Conclusion

US monetary policy has significant spillover effects on other countries. In this paper, we investigate those mechanisms of US monetary policy using a high-frequency approach that allows us to understand the effects and channels through which monetary policy affects foreign economies more directly. When countries do not intervene and US monetary policy unexpectedly tightens, domestic exchange rates depreciate against the US dollar and stock prices fall, disproportionately so for firms that borrow in US dollars, mirroring the experience of earlier episodes, such as the 1990s or during the taper tantrum.

In the 1990s, central bank holdings of foreign exchange reserves were low, and they had limited ability to protect themselves against the spillovers of US monetary policy. However, since the 1990s to today, FX reserves have grown by a magnitude of around 16, as shown in Figure 8, likely in anticipation that those reserves can act as a self-insurance mechanism.

In this paper, we have shown that “intervening against the Fed” mitigates exchange rate depreciation and stock price declines for firms, but only those with US dollar debt. When US monetary policy tightens and central banks counter-intervene, changes in exchange rates and stock prices for firms with and without US dollar debt remain statistically and economically insignificant. These results suggest

that “intervening against the Fed” mutes the balance sheet channel of exchange rates triggered by US monetary policy and can protect countries from exposures to the Global Financial Cycle.

Overall, countries today should be less vulnerable to US monetary policy than in previous tightening cycles. However, some countries’ reserves still remain low, especially those of low-income countries, and their ability to protect themselves from the global financial cycle remains limited.

In this paper, we do not study the trade-offs that are associated with reserve accumulation; instead, we only consider how reserves can be used against a monetary shock to mute balance sheet spillovers. To answer whether policymakers should actually intervene in FX markets, one would require a more granular firm-level dataset that sheds light on the invoicing currency of exports and imports, as well as currency risk hedging at the firm level. We expect that increased data availability will allow for a more detailed policy evaluation. We leave these questions for further research.

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Table 1: Summary Statistics: FFR shock, exchange rate, and stock price

	Mean	Med	S.D.	p5	p95	Obs
(1) FFR shock (basis point)	0.015	-0.48	1.81	-3.1	3.75	90
(2) Exchange rate (% change, $\log(e_{c,t+1}) - \log(e_{c,t-1})$ )	0.04	0	0.72	-1.37	1.29	875
(3) Stock price (% change, $\log(p_{i,t+1}) - \log(p_{i,t-1})$ )	0.02	0	3.48	-5.61	5.71	124,559

Note:  $t$  is the FOMC announcement date.  $e_{c,t+1}$  is the exchange rate in country  $c$  at date  $t + 1$ . A higher  $e_{c,t+1}$  implies the appreciation of the US dollar or depreciation of the local currency.  $p_{i,t+1}$  is the stock price of firm  $i$  at date  $t + 1$ . The stock price is in terms of local currency. Observations (column 6) are the number of FOMC announcement dates (row 1), country  $\times$  FOMC announcement dates (row 2), and firm  $\times$  FOMC announcement dates (row 3).

Table 2: Interventions around 90 FOMC event dates in sample

Country	Frequency			Volume (Millions USD)		Periods
	Buy USD (1)	Sell USD (2)	Counter (3)	Mean (4)	Median (5)	
Argentina	59	45	15	86	52	2003-2019
Australia	0	2	2	19	19	2000-2019
Brazil	11	1	8	165	114	2009-2019
Chile	6	0	4	0.091	0.096	2008-2019
Colombia	34	2	18	19	17	2000-2019
Costa Rica	34	32	3	12	8.1	2006-2019
Georgia	9	12	15	3.9	3.1	2009-2019
Hong Kong	83	58	13	70	12	2000-2019
Japan	4	0	1	1115	1493	2000-2019
Mexico	0	24	7	27	22	2000-2011
Peru	72	51	26	23	4.3	2000-2019
Switzerland	0	0	0	0	0	2000-2001
Turkey	1	1	0	5.9	5.9	2002-2019
Total	312	229	111	57	17	2000-2019

Note: Columns (1) and (2) show the frequencies of buying and selling interventions. “Buying interventions” are defined as occurring when central banks buy the US dollar at least once between date  $t$  and  $t+5$ , where  $t$  is the FOMC announcement date; “selling interventions” are defined analogously. Column (3) shows the frequency of counter-interventions, defined as occurring when the central bank sells the US dollar at least once and never buys the currency again between the dates  $t$  and  $t+5$  after the Fed funds rate increases at date  $t$ ; vice versa when the Fed funds rate decreases. Columns (4) and (5) show the mean and median intervention volumes in terms of millions of US dollars between date  $t$  and  $t+5$  over all FOMC announcement dates  $t$ , respectively, conditioning on intervening at least once between date  $t$  and  $t+5$ . Column (6) shows the sample period when FXI data is available.

Table 3: Sample Firms

Country	Total	Dollar Debt
Argentina	34	25
Australia	1190	126
Brazil	68	21
Chile	3	1
Colombia	22	9
Hong Kong	480	42
Japan	2216	4
Mexico	48	33
Total	4060	261

Note: The table shows the number of all firms and firms with dollar debt in each country. For firms with positive dollar debt, the table shows the number of firms that issued dollar debt at least once during the sample period.

Table 4: Stock Price: Baseline Regression

## (a) Without Intervention

Dependent variable:	$\Delta\text{Stock Price}_{i(c),t}$			
	Dollar Debt	No Dollar Debt	Both	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
FFR Shock <sub><i>t</i></sub>	-0.660*** (0.117)	-0.094** (0.045)	-0.097** (0.045)	
FFR Shock <sub><i>t</i></sub> × Dollar Debt <sub><i>i(c),y-1(t)</i></sub>			-0.314*** (0.087)	-0.259*** (0.071)
$R^2$	0.093	0.032	0.031	0.083
N	1,926	103,155	105,114	105,114
Firm FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country × Date FE				✓

## (b) With Intervention

Dependent variable:	$\Delta\text{Stock Price}_{i(c),t}$			
	Dollar Debt	No Dollar Debt	Both	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
FFR Shock <sub><i>t</i></sub>	-0.217** (0.105)	-0.149*** (0.056)	-0.158** (0.061)	
FFR Shock <sub><i>t</i></sub> × Dollar Debt <sub><i>i(c),y-1(t)</i></sub>			-0.001 (0.042)	-0.033 (0.035)
$R^2$	0.114	0.209	0.194	0.270
N	1,258	9,915	11,178	11,178
Firm FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country × Date FE				✓

Note:  $\Delta\text{Stock Price}_{i(c),t}$  is the change in the log of firm-level stock prices from date  $t - 1$  to  $t + 1$ , where  $t$  is the FOMC announcement date. FFR Shock<sub>*t*</sub> is the Fed funds rate shock in basis points. Dollar Debt<sub>*i(c),y-1(t)*</sub> is an indicator that takes one for firms with dollar debt in the previous year and zero otherwise. We control for one-year lagged export intensity, total assets, liquidity-to-asset ratio, firm age (firm-level), one-year lagged import content of production (industry-level), and their interaction with the Fed funds rate shock. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and date level. The symbols \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 5: Stock Price: Effect of Intervention

Dependent variable:	$\Delta\text{Stock Price}_{i(c),t}$			
	Dollar Debt	No Dollar Debt	Both	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
FFR Shock <sub><i>t</i></sub>	-0.647*** (0.116)	-0.093** (0.045)	-0.096** (0.045)	
FFR Shock <sub><i>t</i></sub> × Intervention <sub><i>c,t</i></sub>	0.449*** (0.130)	-0.035 (0.082)	-0.042 (0.079)	
FFR Shock <sub><i>t</i></sub> × Dollar Debt <sub><i>i(c),y-1(t)</i></sub>			-0.310*** (0.083)	-0.259*** (0.070)
FFR Shock <sub><i>t</i></sub> × Intervention <sub><i>c,t</i></sub> × Dollar Debt <sub><i>i(c),y-1(t)</i></sub>			0.324*** (0.093)	0.232*** (0.067)
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.091	0.033	0.033	0.086
N	3,206	113,534	116,754	116,754
Firm FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country × Date FE				✓

Note:  $\Delta\text{Stock Price}_{i(c),t}$  is the change in the log of firm-level stock prices from date  $t - 1$  to  $t + 1$ , where  $t$  is the FOMC announcement date. FFR Shock<sub>*t*</sub> is the Fed funds rate shock in basis points. Intervention<sub>*c,t*</sub> is an indicator that takes one if there is an unexpected counter-intervention and zero otherwise. Dollar Debt<sub>*i(c),y-1(t)*</sub> is an indicator that takes one for firms with dollar debt in the previous year and zero otherwise. We control for one-year lagged export intensity, total assets, liquidity-to-asset ratio, firm age (firm-level), one-year lagged import content of production (industry-level), and their interaction with the Fed funds rate shock. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and date level. The symbols \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 6: Exchange Rate: Baseline Regression

Dependent Variable:	$\Delta\text{Exchange Rate}_{c,t}$		
	No Intervention	Intervention	Both
	(1)	(2)	(3)
FFR Shock <sub>t</sub>	0.225*** (0.069)	0.004 (0.021)	0.201** (0.072)
Intervention <sub>c,t</sub>			0.266 (0.155)
FFR Shock <sub>t</sub> × Intervention <sub>c,t</sub>			-0.202** (0.072)
$R^2$	0.108	0.083	0.084
N	418	417	836
Country FE	✓	✓	✓

Note:  $\Delta\text{Exchange Rate}_{c,t}$  is the change in the log of the exchange rate from date  $t - 1$  to  $t + 1$ , where  $t$  is the FOMC announcement date. The exchange rate is defined as the value of the US dollar in terms of local currency, and a higher value implies a depreciation of the local currency. FFR Shock<sub>t</sub> is the Fed funds rate shock in basis points. Intervention<sub>c,t</sub> is an indicator that takes one if there is an unexpected counter-intervention and zero otherwise. We control for the trend and standard deviation of the exchange rate before the FOMC announcement date, FXIs before the FOMC announcement date, the one-month lagged policy rate, one-year lagged GDP, inflation, trade balance over GDP ratio, unemployment rate, and their interaction with the Fed funds rate shock. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are double clustered at the country and date level. The symbols \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.



Table 7: FX Reserves

Dependent variable:	$\Delta\text{Exchange Rate}_{c,t}$		$\Delta\text{Stock Price}_{i(c),t}$			
	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
FFR Shock <sub><i>t</i></sub>	0.252*** (0.065)	0.122 (0.071)	-0.075 (0.067)	-0.126 (0.094)		
FFR Shock <sub><i>t</i></sub> × Intervention <sub><i>c,t</i></sub>	-0.298*** (0.089)	-0.161* (0.080)	-0.108 (0.079)	0.162 (0.143)		
FFR Shock <sub><i>t</i></sub> × Dollar Debt <sub><i>i(c),y-1(t)</i></sub>			-0.387** (0.151)	-0.261*** (0.086)	-0.352*** (0.108)	-0.230*** (0.079)
FFR Shock <sub><i>t</i></sub> × Intervention <sub><i>c,t</i></sub> × Dollar Debt <sub><i>i(c),y-1(t)</i></sub>			0.418** (0.172)	0.137 (0.112)	0.317*** (0.118)	0.201* (0.102)
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.121	0.149	0.053	0.051	0.109	0.098
N	422	413	90,860	25,880	90,860	25,880
Country FE	✓	✓				
Firm FE			✓	✓	✓	✓
Country × Date FE					✓	✓

Note: Columns (1) and (2) show the results for country-level exchange rates, and columns (3) to (6) show the results for firm-level stock prices.  $\Delta\text{Exchange Rate}_{c,t}$  is the change in the log of the exchange rate from date  $t - 1$  to  $t + 1$ , and  $\Delta\text{Stock Price}_{i(c),t}$  is the change in the log of firm-level stock prices from date  $t - 1$  to  $t + 1$ , where  $t$  is the FOMC announcement date. FFR Shock<sub>*t*</sub> is the Fed funds rate shock in basis points. Intervention<sub>*c,t*</sub> is an indicator that takes one if there is an unexpected counter-intervention and zero otherwise. Dollar Debt<sub>*i(c),y-1(t)*</sub> is an indicator that takes one for firms with dollar debt in the previous year and zero otherwise. Large and small FX reserves are defined so that the volume of FX reserves is larger and smaller than the median, respectively. In columns (1) and (2), we control for the trend and standard deviation of the exchange rate before the FOMC announcement date, FXIs before the FOMC announcement date, one-month lagged policy rate, one-year lagged GDP, inflation, trade balance over GDP ratio, unemployment rate, and their interaction with the Fed funds rate shock. In columns (3)-(6), we control for one-year lagged export intensity, total assets, liquidity-to-asset ratio, firm age (firm-level), one-year lagged import content of production (industry-level), and their interaction with the Fed funds rate shock. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and date level. The symbols \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 8: Stock Price: Robustness Checks with Different Definitions with Dollar Debt

Dependent Variable	$\Delta\text{Stock Price}_{i(c),t}$			
	Low \$ Debt	High \$ Debt	All \$ Debt	Continuous \$ Debt
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
FFR Shock <sub>t</sub>	-0.097** (0.045)	-0.098** (0.046)	-0.099** (0.046)	-0.102** (0.046)
FFR Shock <sub>t</sub> × Intervention <sub>c,t</sub>	-0.039 (0.079)	-0.040 (0.080)	-0.041 (0.080)	-0.035 (0.080)
FFR Shock <sub>t</sub> × Dollar Debt	-0.303*** (0.086)	-0.311*** (0.083)	-0.345*** (0.070)	-0.043*** (0.011)
FFR Shock <sub>t</sub> × Intervention <sub>c,t</sub> × Dollar Debt	0.293*** (0.082)	0.345*** (0.073)	0.468*** (0.145)	0.044*** (0.010)
$R^2$	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033
N	116,754	116,754	116,754	116,754
Firm FE	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note:  $\Delta\text{Stock Price}_{i(c),t}$  is the change in the log of firm-level stock prices from date  $t - 1$  to  $t + 1$ , where  $t$  is the FOMC announcement date. FFR Shock<sub>t</sub> is the Fed funds rate shock in basis points. Intervention<sub>c,t</sub> is an indicator that takes one if there is an unexpected counter-intervention and zero otherwise. Dollar Debt<sub>i(c),y-1(t)</sub> is an indicator that takes one for firms with dollar debt in the previous year and zero otherwise. We control for one-year lagged export intensity, total assets, liquidity-to-asset ratio, firm age (firm-level), one-year lagged import content of production (industry-level), and their interaction with the Fed funds rate shock. Columns (1) and (2) estimate the specification for firms whose dollar debt over total debt ratio is above the 25th and 50th percentiles, respectively. Column (3) estimates the specification for firms that only issue dollar debt. Column (4) uses a standardized share of dollar debt over total debt. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and date level. The symbols \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 9: Stock Price: Other Robustness Checks

Dependent Variable	$\Delta \text{Stock Price}_{i(c),t}$									
	Mean FXI	p75 FXI	FXI Volume	Large FXI	Daily Policy Rate	Zero FFR Shock	Excl. GFC	Debt Maturity	Int Asset Sales	Stock Denom.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
FFR Shock <sub>t</sub>	-0.100** (0.046)	-0.108** (0.046)	-0.102** (0.047)	-0.096** (0.045)	-0.119** (0.045)	-0.115** (0.053)	-0.104** (0.047)	-0.104** (0.047)	-0.089** (0.043)	-0.177** (0.075)
FFR Shock <sub>t</sub> × Intervention <sub>c,t</sub>	-0.110 (0.079)	0.066 (0.108)	-0.030 (0.086)	0.010 (0.116)	0.016 (0.110)	-0.029 (0.098)	-0.029 (0.084)	-0.034 (0.079)	-0.011 (0.078)	0.049 (0.116)
FFR Shock <sub>t</sub> × Dollar Debt <sub>i(c),y-1(t)</sub>	-0.247*** (0.077)	-0.206*** (0.067)	-0.212*** (0.062)	-0.316*** (0.083)	-0.264*** (0.087)	-0.294*** (0.102)	-0.307*** (0.085)	-0.666*** (0.151)	-0.323*** (0.084)	-0.382*** (0.102)
FFR Shock <sub>t</sub> × Intervention <sub>c,t</sub> × Dollar Debt <sub>i(c),y-1(t)</sub>	0.309*** (0.100)	0.227** (0.099)	0.135* (0.075)	0.329*** (0.098)	0.281*** (0.103)	0.304** (0.124)	0.331*** (0.094)	0.620** (0.302)	0.325*** (0.092)	0.378*** (0.110)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.034	0.034	0.022	0.037	0.033	0.034	0.038
N	116,754	116,754	115,223	112,558	109,808	188,394	99,255	116,754	110,769	116,753
Firm FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓


Note:  $\Delta \text{Stock Price}_{i(c),t}$  is the change in the log of firm-level stock prices from date  $t - 1$  to  $t + 1$ , where  $t$  is the FOMC announcement date. FFR Shock<sub>t</sub> is the Fed funds rate shock in basis points. Intervention<sub>c,t</sub> is an indicator that takes one if there is an unexpected counter-intervention and zero otherwise. Dollar Debt<sub>i(c),y-1(t)</sub> is an indicator that takes one for firms with dollar debt in the previous year and zero otherwise. We control for one-year lagged export intensity, total assets, liquidity-to-asset ratio, firm age (firm-level), one-year lagged import content of production (industry-level), and their interaction with the Fed funds rate shock. Column (1) defines counter-intervention so that the central banks' average net sales of US dollars between dates  $t$  and  $t + 5$  are positive when the Fed funds rate increases on date  $t$ , and vice versa when the Fed funds rate decreases. Column (2) defines unexpected counter-intervention if the residual from estimating Equation 1 is larger than the 75th percentile. Column (3) uses the FXI-over-GDP ratio when estimating Equation 1. Column (4) estimates the specification for large FXIs, defined so that the average net purchase of the US dollar is larger than the 25th percentile in absolute value. Column (5) controls for the daily monetary policy rate. Column (6) includes FOMC event dates with a zero Fed funds rate shock. Column (7) excludes the Global Financial Crisis. Column (8) estimates the specification for maturing dollar debt, defined as the dollar debt that matures within six months before and after the FOMC announcement date. Column (9) controls for one-year lagged international assets over total assets ratio and international sales over total sales ratio. Column (10) denominates the stock price in US dollars. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and date level. The symbols \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 10: Exchange Rate: Robustness Checks

Dependent Variable:	$\Delta\text{Exchange Rate}_{c,t}$						
	Mean FXI	p75 FXI	FXI Volume	Large FXI	Daily Policy Rate	Zero FFR Shock	Excl. GFC
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
FFR shock	0.146** (0.049)	0.121** (0.041)	0.143** (0.064)	0.206** (0.071)	0.274** (0.119)	0.210** (0.084)	0.243*** (0.067)
Intervention <sub>c,t</sub>	0.181 (0.168)	-0.047 (0.162)	0.058 (0.183)	0.223 (0.163)	0.303 (0.205)	0.157** (0.061)	0.217 (0.158)
FFR shock $\times$ Intervention <sub>c,t</sub>	-0.117** (0.044)	-0.150* (0.076)	-0.140** (0.051)	-0.211** (0.083)	-0.363** (0.155)	-0.196** (0.081)	-0.231*** (0.068)
$R^2$	0.074	0.071	0.092	0.103	0.083	0.064	0.107
N	836	836	829	741	683	1,289	754
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓


Note:  $\Delta\text{Exchange Rate}_{c,t}$  is the change in the log of the exchange rate from date  $t - 1$  to  $t + 1$ , where  $t$  is the FOMC announcement date. The exchange rate is defined as the value of the US dollar in terms of local currency, and a higher value implies a depreciation of the local currency. FFR Shock<sub>t</sub> is the Fed funds rate shock in basis points. Intervention<sub>c,t</sub> is an indicator that takes one if there is an unexpected counter-intervention and zero otherwise. We control for the trend and standard deviation of the exchange rate before the FOMC announcement date, FXIs before the FOMC announcement date, one-month lagged policy rate, one-year lagged GDP, inflation, trade balance over GDP ratio, unemployment rate, and their interaction with the Fed funds rate shock. Column (1) defines counter-intervention so that the central banks' average net sales of US dollars between dates  $t$  and  $t + 5$  are positive when the Fed funds rate increases on date  $t$ , and vice versa when the Fed funds rate decreases. Column (2) defines unexpected counter-intervention if the residual from estimating Equation 1 is larger than the 75th percentile. Column (3) uses the FXI-over-GDP ratio when estimating Equation 1. Column (4) estimates the specification for large FXIs, defined so that the average net purchase of the US dollar is larger than the 25th percentile in absolute value. Column (5) controls for the daily monetary policy rate. Column (6) includes FOMC event dates with a zero Fed funds rate shock. Column (7) excludes the Global Financial Crisis. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are double clustered at the country and date level. The symbols \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Figure 1: Spot Exchange Rate: US Dollar to Japanese Yen




Note: The figure reports the minute-by-minute US dollar to Japanese yen spot exchange rate on September 22, 2022. The exchange rate is defined as the value of one US dollar in terms of yen, and a higher value implies the appreciation of the dollar or depreciation of the Japanese yen. Source: Datastream.

Figure 2: Variance Decomposition for Counter-Intervention




Note: The figure shows the results for variance decomposition for Equation (1). We control for the Fed funds rate shock, one-month lagged policy rate, one-year lagged GDP, CPI inflation rate, trade balance over GDP ratio, unemployment rate, their interaction with the Fed funds rate shock, and FXIs before the FOMC event dates. We include country fixed effect.

Figure 3: Example for Estimating Policy Rule



Note: The figure shows the result for the variance decomposition for Equation (1). Column (a) shows the result for a US monetary tightening and US dollar sales intervention by the Reserve Bank of Australia on November 15, 2000. Column (b) shows the result for a US monetary easing and US dollar purchase intervention by the Central Bank of Argentina on March 22, 2005.


Figure 4: Stock Price: Difference-in-Difference



Note: The figure plots the estimates of the effect of the Fed funds rate shock and FXIs on stock prices. See Equations 2 and 4 for the exact specifications. We control for one-year lagged export intensity, total assets, liquidity-to-asset ratio, firm age (firm-level), one-year lagged import content of production (industry-level), and their interaction with the Fed funds rate shock. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and date level. The confidence interval is 90%.




Figure 5: Stock Price: Triple Interaction




Note: The figure plots the estimates of the effect of the Fed funds rate shock and FXIs on stock prices. See Equation Equation 5 for the exact specifications. We control for one-year lagged export intensity, total assets, liquidity-to-asset ratio, firm age (firm-level), one-year lagged import content of production (industry-level), and their interaction with the Fed funds rate shock. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and date level. The confidence interval is 90%.

Figure 6: Exchange Rate: Difference-in-Differences




Note: The figure plots the estimates of the effect of the Fed funds rate shock and FXIs on exchange rates. See Equation 4 for the exact specification. The exchange rate is defined as the value of the US dollar in terms of local currency, and a higher value implies a depreciation of the local currency. We control for the standard deviation of the exchange rate before the FOMC announcement date, FXIs before the FOMC announcement date, one-month lagged policy rate, one-year lagged GDP, inflation, trade balance over GDP ratio, unemployment rate, and their interaction with the Fed funds rate shock. Standard errors are double clustered at the country and date level. The confidence interval is 90%.

Figure 7: Stock Price: Expenditure Switching Channel



Note: The figure plots the estimates of the effect of the Fed funds rate shock and FXIs on stock prices for exporters and non-exporters. See Equations 3 and 5 for the exact specifications. We control for one-year lagged dollar debt, total assets, liquidity-to-asset ratio, firm age (firm-level), one-year lagged import content of production (industry-level), and their interaction with the Fed funds rate shock. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and date level. The confidence interval is 90%.

Figure 8: Foreign Exchange Reserves in Sample Countries



Note: The figure reports the volume of foreign exchange (FX) reserves (left) and the FX reserves over GDP ratio in our sample of 13 countries. For the FX reserves over GDP ratio, we took the ratio of total FX reserves over total GDP in our sample countries. Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.

# Appendix

## A Data Construction

This section provides the data definition and cleaning procedure. The firm-level data on fundamentals and balance sheets, the variable definitions, and cleaning procedures follow the standard literature on monetary policy and corporate balance sheet risk, for example, [Ottonello and Winberry \(2020\)](#). The cleaning procedure of Capital IQ data follows [Kim et al. \(2020\)](#).

### A.1 Data Definition

- *Leverage*: the ratio of total debt over total assets.
- *Share of dollar debt*: the ratio of the total due amount of dollar debt (the sum of due amounts of debt instruments whose repayment currency is the U.S. dollar) over the total due amount of debt denominated in all currencies.
- *Size*: total assets, which are denominated in local currency and deflated by consumer price index (CPI).
- *Liquidity*: the ratio of cash and short-term investments over total assets.
- *Age*: years after the incorporation date.
- *Export intensity*: the ratio of exports over total sales.
- *Import content of production*: the import content of exports, defined as the contribution of imports to the production of goods and services.

### A.2 Data Cleaning Procedure


We only use data from publicly listed firms, as the data on stock prices is available. The sample only includes ultimate corporate parents, which are headquartered in each country. Moreover, the sample excludes the following:

- Firm-year observations in which balance sheet information is not reported.
- Firm-year observations in which the currency composition of debt is not reported.
- Each control, including total assets, principal due, tangible assets, liquidity, and long-term investment, belongs to the top or bottom 1% in each country.
- Leverage belongs to the top 1% in each country.

- Financial firms (SIC industry code: 6000-6999).
- Government institution.
- Firm-year observations in which the sum of cash and cash equivalents and tangible assets is greater than the total assets.
- Firm-year observations in which the difference between the total assets and the sum of total liabilities and equity is greater than 10,000 U.S. dollars.
- Firm-year observations in which the difference between the sum of principal dues of all individual debt instruments, which is available in the detailed financial statement, and the total principal due of debt, which is available in the main financial statement, is greater than 100,000 U.S. dollars.
- Firm-year observations in which the sum of due amounts of U.S. dollar debt in the detailed financial statement is greater than the total due amounts in the main financial statement.


## B Additional Figures

Figure A1: Stock Price: Weight by the Number of Firms with Dollar Debt



Note: The figure plots the estimates of the effect of the Fed funds rate shock and FXIs on stock prices. See Equations 2 and 4 for the exact specifications. We control for one-year lagged export intensity, total assets, liquidity-to-asset ratio, firm age (firm-level), one-year lagged import content of production (industry-level), and their interaction with the Fed funds rate shock. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and date level. We weight the regression by  $1/n_{i(c)}$ , where  $n_{i(c)}$  is the number of firms with dollar debt in country  $c$  where firm  $i$  belongs. The confidence interval is 90%.


Figure A2: Stock Price: Exclude Each Country from Sample



Note: The figure plots the estimates of the effect of the Fed funds rate shock and FXIs on stock prices. Each line shows the point estimates after excluding each country when estimating Equations 2 and 4. We control for one-year lagged export intensity, total assets, liquidity-to-asset ratio, firm age (firm-level), one-year lagged import content of production (industry-level), and their interaction with the Fed funds rate shock.



Figure A3: Exchange Rate: Exclude Each Country from Sample



Note: The figure plots the estimates of the effect of the Fed funds rate shock and FXIs on the exchange rate. Each line shows the point estimates after excluding each country when estimating Equations 2 and 4. The exchange rate is defined as the value of the US dollar in terms of local currency, and a higher value implies a depreciation of the local currency. We control for the standard deviation of the exchange rate before the FOMC announcement date, FXIs before the FOMC announcement date, one-month lagged policy rate, one-year lagged GDP, inflation, trade balance over GDP ratio, unemployment rate, and their interaction with the Fed funds rate shock.