We explore whether there is evidence of property rights amongst the homeless, and if so, how these rights are governed. We show that although the homeless are able to derive some value from assets, and can exclude other members of their community, these rights are precarious and dependent upon state agents not seizing the “property” and overriding the community’s rules of the game. The transferring of assets are especially curtailed.
The purpose of the paper is to examine the impact of property rights on foreign direct investment (FDI) in Zimbabwe for the period 1964-2005. While the macroeconomic determinants of FDI have been analysed to a considerable extent in past empirical work, the role of institutional factors such as the protection of property rights and the efficiency of the legal system has been underexplored. Using a multivariate cointegration framework, the paper employs a newly constructed de jure property rights index for Zimbabwe to determine the impact of property rights on FDI.