We explore whether there is evidence of property rights amongst the homeless, and if so, how these rights are governed. We show that although the homeless are able to derive some value from assets, and can exclude other members of their community, these rights are precarious and dependent upon state agents not seizing the “property” and overriding the community’s rules of the game. The transferring of assets are especially curtailed.
Law and Economics: General
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of institutions on fixed capital accumulation over time in two developing countries, both former German colonies: Namibia and Tanzania. This is motivated by two recent underpinning theories: the new institutional theory, which views institutions as fundamental determinants of economic outcomes and income variations among countries (the institutional hypothesis); and the theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty, which emphasis the impact of uncertainty on investment and capital-stock accumulation.
This paper presents a database on institutional measures for Namibia for the period 1884 to 2008. Using the techniques of principal components and factor analysis in aggregating these indicators, the study does two things. First, it illustrates a methodology for constructing de jure and de facto institutional measures by means of using pieces of legislation and quantitative data, respectively. Secondly, these indicators are used to assess the nature of political and economic institutional transformation from the colonial legacy to the modern outcome using Namibia as a natural experiment.
This paper is part of series of studies focusing on the measurement and definition of institutions. This paper presents a database on institutional measures for Tanzania for the period 1884 to 2008. These indicators are used to assess the nature of political and economic institutional transformation from the colonial legacy to the modern outcome, using Tanzania as a natural experiment. The paper argues that despite changes in colonial regimes, the broader framework of institutions remained partly the same.
This paper presents new institutional measures for Zambia. Coverage is of political rights and freedoms, of property rights, and of political instability. The sample period is from 1947 to 2007. Comparison of the indices with directly comparable Zimbabwean and Malawian series, shows strong sources of divergence in institutional conditions. The paper also considers interaction amongst the institutional measures, and between the institutional measures and measures of economic development.
This paper aims to construct a new set of institutional indicators for Malawi. Our political freedom index correlates strongly with the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties indices, but consists of a far longer time series, which can be used to examine long-run issues with greater efficacy. The high correlations between the political freedoms index and the various property rights indices suggests that, in the Malawian case, lack of political freedom is associated with lack of economic freedom and security.