Climate change has brought renewed and increasing attention to the productivity and efficiency of the water sector. This has stimulated interest, which has manifested itself in the increased application of statistical tools to measure the productivity and efficiency of water utilities. Policymakers in developed countries are already making use of statistical analyses of water systems for determining productivity and efficiency.
We explore the effects of announcements of future punishment opportunities in public goods games. Announcements can influence subject behaviour, through changing expectations, before the institution is implemented (adjustment effect) or after implementation (adaptation effect). Our results indicate that announcements do not lead to significant adjustment effects, nor increased free-riding before implementation. Once punishment opportunities are implemented, those forewarned with announcements exhibit positive adaptation effects.
South Africa is a water-stressed country that over a protracted period has suffered from poor water service delivery. The major problems are inefficient operations, lack of capacity in spending allocated budgets, unclear management structures, and a long term decline in capital expenditure. Economists have long argued that private investment will bring good fiscal control and efficient structures and improve service delivery. However, there may be trade-offs between this improved economic efficiency and the necessity to pursue more egalitarian social outcomes.
If local communities living adjacent to the elephant see it as a burden, then they cannot be trusted to be its stewards. To assess their valuation of it, a CVM study was conducted for one CAMPFIRE district in Zimbabwe. Respondents were classified according to their preferences over the elephant. The median WTP for the preservation of 200 elephants is ZW$260 (US$4.73) for respondents who considered the elephant a public good while the same statistic is ZW$137 (US$2.49) for those favouring its translocation.