This paper departs from the traditional aid–economic growth studies through its examination of the impact of aid and its volatility on sectoral growth by relying on panel dataset of 37 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries for the period 1980–2014. Findings from our system generalised methods of moments (GMM) show that, while foreign aid significantly drives economic transformation, aid volatility deteriorates sectoral value additions with huge impact on the non–tradable sector and a no apparent effect on the agricultural sector.
Funding constraints experienced by Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries has led to reliance on foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign aid as alternative sources of finance. Despite the importance of FDI for growth, SSA has failed to attract an increasing share of global FDI and at the same time faces volatile aid flows. This study examines the role of foreign aid in enhancing FDI inflows to 31 SSA countries for the period 1995 to 2012.
The foreign aid arena as it pertains to the African continent has traditionally been dominated by the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, however over the last three decades non-traditional donors such as the China, South Africa and Brazil have emerged in the donor field. The increasing importance of non-traditional donors has meant that the economic and political stronghold of Western and OECD countries in sub-Sahara African (SSA) has gradually ebbed, due to increased competition amongst donors on the continent.
This paper estimates a Bayesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model of Malawi and uses it to account for short-run monetary policy response to aid inflows between 1980 and 2010. In particular, the paper evaluates the existence of a “Dutch Disease” following an increase in foreign aid and examines the Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM) reaction to aid inflows under different monetary policy rules. The paper finds strong evidence of “Taylor rule” like response of monetary policy to aid inflows.
The international community uses a number of interventions to make and build peace. How effective are these interventions? What works and what does not? The discussion highlights the uncertainties when evaluating interventions. Although some interventions are frequently advocated we know very little about their success. Some of the commonly advocated interventions have been assessed in large n-studies. Although there is no evidence that development aid helps to prevent wars, there is evidence that aid stabilizes post-war situations.
Recent shifts in the global debt relief architecture has meant that countries with superior institutions are often rewarded with increasinf aid and debt relied, an incentive for debtor countries to strategically improve their institutions prior to seeking debt relief. This paper contributes to the literature by developing and empirically testing a political economy model of the possible impact of this shift on the motivations of politicians and bureaucrats in debtor countries.
During the last decade international aid flows diminished while Africa’s relative share of global foreign direct investment (FDI) declined. This went together with lacklustre growth and low human development levels. In 2005, the G8 countries announced that they would increase aid to Africa by some $25 billion per annum. The pledge for increasing aid seems to have triggered an extensive debate about the role of aid and other international capital flows in the development of poorer countries. This study contributes to this debate.