International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
Recent shifts in the global debt relief architecture has meant that countries with superior institutions are often rewarded with increasinf aid and debt relied, an incentive for debtor countries to strategically improve their institutions prior to seeking debt relief. This paper contributes to the literature by developing and empirically testing a political economy model of the possible impact of this shift on the motivations of politicians and bureaucrats in debtor countries.
This paper investigates structural symmetry among SADC countries in order to establish, judged by modern OCA theory, which of these countries may possibly make for a good monetary matrimony and which countries may be left out in the cold. SADC remains adamant that it would conclude monetary union by 2018. It can ill afford a repeat of the type of financial and fiscal instability brought about by ex ante structural economic differences and asynchronous business cycles in the EU. This study contributes to the literature on macro-economic convergence in the SADC region.
In this paper we analyze disinflation policy when a central bank has imperfect information about private sector inflation expectations but learns about them from economic outcomes, which are in part the result of the disinflation policy itself. The form of uncertainty is manifested as uncertainty about the effect of past disinflation policy on the current output gap. This differs from other studies on learning and control in a monetary policy context (e.g. Ellison (2006) and Svensson and Williams (2007)) that assume uncertainty about the effects of current policy actions on the economy.
In this paper we incorporate the term structure of interest rates in a standard inflation forecast targeting framework. We find that under flexible inflation targeting and uncertainty in the degree of persistence in the economy, allowing for active learning possibilities has effects on the optimal interest rate rule followed by the central bank.